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THE FORTNIGHTLY

MAY, 1948

WESTERN LIGHTS

BY WILLIAM RYDAL

WRITING in THE FORTNIGHTLY in January 1947* I sought to dispel the One World illusion to which progressive societies and persons the world over have so long been addicted and to commend in its place the goal of European unity. I argued that the primary mission of our time, as well as the only sure way of successfully meeting the Russian challenge, was to establish, through a nucleus of European Union, a rallying-point for all who prize the values of Western civilization, the democratic way of life as we understand it in the west. Central to my argument was the need for distinguishing carefully between elaborate Meccano thought-structures and the indispensable minimum of political construction which is actually practicable. To-day, sixteen months later, the initial step has been taken. Western union exists in embryonic form, the air is thick with official and unofficial plans for the organization and reconstruction of Europe—and, needless to say, the federalists are in full cry. Does the present action of the Governments, however, measure up to the vital needs of the age? Can a hard core of European substance be created and preserved, at the same time as the ballast of the perfectionists is jettisoned? These would seem to be the questions that must be asked in any review of the swift progress of events since Mr. Bevin's catalytic speech in the House of Commons on January 22.

The chief agencies of the transformation since January 1947, it must be admitted, have been extra-European: on the one hand the Jekyll-and-Hyde phenomenon of Russian intransigence and Communist mischief, and, on the other, American crusading zeal, which bids fair to convert the original salvage operation of the Marshall Plan into an anti-Communist crusade. Now, the dangers of any European integration effected by these two external influences are patent. A 'western bloc', conceived simply as a concentration of power directed against the U.S.S.R., is not at all the same thing as a union of free nations which should be the embodiment of all that is best in European civilization. The erection of a dam against Russian power, the adoption of measures of decontamination in the presence of the Communist plague—all this sort of thing, indeed, may be urgently necessary, and the Truman doctrine of aid to the threatened nations perfectly intelligible; but any such negative and defensive

* "World Mirage."

expedients need to be sharply distinguished in our minds from the positive task of building up a western European polity : the inclusion of a near-Fascist element like Franco Spain, for example, could only be a fatal political liability to the kind of union which is premised, and neither Greece nor Turkey qualifies as a western nation. The European recovery scheme fostered by Mr. Marshall, which seeks the maximum of economic expansion, must, of course, spread its net wide, and cannot be entirely divorced from political considerations. But it is essentially a plan of economic rehabilitation, and it is an egregious fallacy to suppose that political unity will automatically grow out of common economic interests. This mistaken view is obstinately held by far too many Englishmen in high places. Let it be clearly understood, moreover, that what the British Government is faced with to-day is no passing emergency to be met by a temporary association with the other war-stricken—or war-threatened—nations of Europe but the supreme test, first posed by M. Briand in 1929-30 (and in which then we failed) of this country's ability to "speak European".

Mr. Bevin's outline of policy on January 22 was cautious enough in all conscience : so nebulous and imprecise, indeed, were his references to the new departure made necessary by the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers that one could be pardoned for thinking that his utterance was nothing more than a politician's lip-service to "western union" which concealed a basically isolationist attitude. The perfunctory suggestion to the Benelux countries that they should make haste to concert treaties with the United Kingdom on the pattern of the Treaty of Dunkirk only went to confirm that impression. Meanwhile, however, M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, with characteristic aplomb and vigour, assumed the leadership which London was handling so gingerly. The shock of the storming of the democratic defences of Czechoslovakia, too, had manifestly a salutary effect in clearing away some of the cobwebs. The result was the Brussels Five-Power Treaty, hailed by Mr. Bevin as the "hard core" round which western union can be built.

That Treaty, signed on March 17, undoubtedly represents a landmark in the history of our times. It runs for fifty years. It postulates maximum co-ordination in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Article 4, based on the collective self-defence clause of the United Nations Charter (Article 51), provides guarantees of automatic assistance in Europe to any one of the associating States. By stipulating that it should be open to other States to accede, subject to certain conditions, the authors of the Treaty clearly marked it off from such "regional arrangements" as the Rio de Janeiro Treaty (covered by Article 52 of the Charter), mindful of the fact that regional groups so characterized may act only *after* the Security Council has given authorization. And, although there is nothing in the Treaty about any joint plan of action or the creation of a joint military staff, this clause was duly amplified in the Five Power announce-

ment on April 17. Article 7 provides a pledge to create a consultative council "which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" and which is required to meet *immediately*, should any situation arise which may constitute a threat to peace, "in whatever area this threat should arise"—implying a wider range, that is to say, than the mutual assistance pledge of Article 4. All this amounts to an assertion of common interest in every field of policy. And in the Preamble, which is perhaps the most significant part of the text, the contracting parties—France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg and Great Britain—solemnly pledge themselves anew to cherish and preserve the fundamental human rights, to maintain civil liberties, to uphold the rule of law and so on, a welcome re-affirmation of all that constitutes the ethos and common patrimony of the free nations.

Measured simply in terms of defence, it is true, the contribution of this country goes no further than what has traditionally been accepted as a British vital interest: any threat to the Channel Ports was ever a threat to our own shores. The novelty is in the formal acceptance of commitments, an abandonment of the empirical approach which indeed merits the chorus of satisfaction that has gone up from our Continental neighbours. On paper, then, "Britain becomes what she never has been in modern times: an integral part of Europe, a land with a continental frontier."* This is one noteworthy advance marked by the Brussels Treaty: the other, of course, is the abandonment by the Low Countries of their traditional neutrality policy.

What must be said, however, and deplored, is that this Treaty—like the parallel economic organization of the Paris Conference—does not purport to create a European (or, let us say, western European) authority. As the leader-writer in *The Observer* of March 14, writing on the eve of the signature of the Treaty, pertinently comments:

Liaison by agencies of less than Governmental status leaves each separate national Government still in the position of the highest authority and the final arbiter; national sovereignty remains untouched.

And he goes on:

A possible criticism of the Treaty is that it prescribes too weak an institutional framework for the forces which it tends to unite; that it sets up aims which can be achieved only by real Union without providing a real Union. Before long we may well find that in order to make the Treaty work we must go the whole hog and pool our sovereignties. The deepest historical significance of the Treaty may one day be seen in the fact that, although it shied away from Union, it left us no choice but Union or failure."

That is a fair criticism. The Brussels Treaty, like any other pact concluded by the professional attorneys of the respective States, is designed to operate wholly within the context of national sovereignty. It prescribes, in fact, just such consultation among the interested parties as would in any case take place through the ordinary processes of diplomacy; and the agencies to be set up are duly subordinate to their national Governments. This is

* *The Observer*, March 14, 1948

not western union, for which the hungry sheep look up, it is not integration : there is here no abatement of national sovereignty such as Mr. Eden pleaded for, and Mr. Bevin himself foretold in his famous House of Commons speech in November 1945, with its vision of a world assembly composed of delegates directly elected by the peoples. And, with regard to economic matters, specifically, Mr. Bevin in his speech to the Committee of European Economic Co-operation on March 15, dotted the i's and crossed the t's. He recognized the need for setting up "the right kind of organization with the right kind of objective"—and then restricted his appeal to one for team-work and the team-spirit (in the best public school tradition !), saying : "I do not want to bring in any abstract discussion on sovereignty. It does not arise..." Yet is it not an open secret that the U.K. delegation fought very hard to resist the French efforts to establish something in the way of an international executive authority for the administration of the European Recovery Programme and to ensure that power in the Continuing Organization is vested in the national delegations ? Whenever an Englishman starts inveighing against the abstract, you may be sure he is intent on evasive action !

As Foreign Secretary, it may be said, Mr. Bevin can do no other. His expert advisers, trained to think exclusively in terms of H.M.G. and—the Rest, are unable to conceive of a wider authority of which Britain is only a part. Fortunately back-bench Members of Parliament are not necessarily thus inhibited. Hence the importance of the all-party motion, launched on the eve of Mr. Bevin's journey to Paris and Brussels, which looks forward to a real fusion of the units of Western Europe, which calls for the creation of "a *political union* strong enough to save European democracy and the values of Western civilization." The 170-odd signatories of this programme are no starry-eyed utopians.* They distinguish between the necessary *emergency policy* "designed to secure immediate and effective co-operation between the countries of Western Europe" and a long-term policy "designed to bring into being a Federation of Europe." What the British Government (with the other signatories of the Brussels Treaty) is doing answers well enough to the description of the former : Mr. Bevin has expressly, and emphatically, dissociated the Government from seeking to compass the latter. Yet everything hinges on this country being brought to face up to the revolutionary change implied in a real union and, ultimately, a design for Europe as a whole.

The terminology employed in the M.P.s' declaration (which has its counterpart, apparently, in similar motions calling for a European Constituent Assembly tabled in the Parliaments of other Western European States) is not altogether happy. For a first requirement of the emergency policy, we are told, is the establishment of a Council of Western Europe "consisting of representatives of the Governments of the

* This use of the term "utopian" as opposed to "realist" is borrowed from Professor E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.

sixteen participating countries in the European Recovery Plan and Western Germany . . ." There is a confusion here between the arrangements for American-aided economic stabilization and development of Europe as a whole and the immediate task of "consolidation of western Europe" in Mr. Bevin's phrase. Point 4, setting forth the long-term policy, contains a similar loose identification of Europe and western Europe. And the choice of the term 'federation', as it happens, at once bedevils the issue. For federation, in any proper sense of the term, is such a long way off that the mere mention of it stirs up in the bosom of the 'realist' all the instincts of rebellion, and there is a distinct danger that the necessary process of integration of western Europe which can and must be here and now, may get lost in the mists of 'federal union'.

One immediate consequence of the M.P.'s Declaration (apart from its making nonsense of the Labour Party's sectarian attitude to the forthcoming "United States of Europe" conference at the Hague, with which I am not concerned here) was a most illuminating correspondence in *The Times*. I cannot better conclude this article than by making a brief analysis of this exchange of views. Mr. Wilson Harris, the editor of *The Spectator*, set the ball rolling* with an explanation of the reason why he was not prepared to sign a cheque for federation. While entirely in agreement with the short-term policy, he said, the long-term programme envisaged meant

commitment here and now to the principle of a European super-government, to which our own country, in spite of its intimate association with the Dominions, would be subject in regard to defence (which involves finance), external affairs and other vital matters . . .

He was answered by one of the signatories, Mr. John Martin, who pointed out that consultation with the other members of the Commonwealth was indeed necessary as a preliminary to further action by Britain—and was specifically postulated in the motion. But in any case the *caveat* formulated by Mr. Wilson Harris applied just as much to the short-term as to the long-term proposals. Definite material support of some kind, not only from the Dominions but also from the United States, was a condition precedent of "western union", but why assume that such backing was going to be withheld? (President Truman's endorsement—in carefully-chosen words—of the Brussels Pact on the following day aptly underscored Mr. Martin's premiss). Another correspondent on the same day made the debating point that the only "subjects" of a federal government are the individual citizens. Which impelled Mr. Wilson Harris in a second letter to re-state with greater precision the arguments against the federal nexus and to echo the familiar warning against 'trying to run before you can walk.' He secured his place on the side of the angels, however, by agreeing that "the closer confederation, a union between

* *The Times*, March 15.

Governments, can be made, the better." On the same day appeared a communication from the Chairman of the Council (and members of the Executive Committee) of Federal Union opining that a Council of Western Europe in the sense of a league of European Governments could not be anything but a first and very temporary step, that any such assemblage of sovereign States must inevitably suffer from the same crucial defect as the League of Nations, lack of executive power. Then Mr. Emery Reves, author of *The Anatomy of Peace*, weighed in, and with supporting letters from Lionel Curtis, high priest in this country of the federal idea, and his opposite number in the Labour Party, Mr. R. W. G. Mackay, we had the pure milk of the gospel of federal union. Mr. Mackay, it may be noted, however—wiser than the authors of the parliamentary motion—confined his case for federation, as distinct from confederation, to western Europe. These apostles of federation were effectively answered by Professor Mitrany who pointed to the tremendous difference between the device of federation—that is union for certain common purposes—in the eighteenth or even nineteenth century and the burdens which would be imposed on a similar authority in the international field to-day: in the present era of economic and social planning, he contended, the federal instrument would be inappropriate, and a new international authority would have to be hardly less than a full-fledged international government. That is certainly not in sight to-day. And Lord Merthyr attacked on the flank with a lucid reiteration of the two-point nostrum associated with the late Lord Davies and the *New Commonwealth Society* (still alive and kicking)—not federation, but a central authority equipped with an international police force and an equity tribunal.

In the realm of logic, indeed, this thesis is unanswerable. The trouble is that life is not a thing of logic. It is perfectly true that the root of all our troubles is the modern fetish of national sovereignty. But the hooks to bind Leviathan which we must contrive will be more subtle than any mere projections of the human brain, they may well be almost invisible and they will certainly be mainly functional. When that has been said, however, let it be recognized that diplomacy by conference, which is still apparently the British Government's conception of international action, is not enough, that there is need—and also the possibility—here and now of some permanent form of organic union, beginning with western Europe. As Mr. Robert Boothby (to whom credit for the M.P.'s motion on the Conservative side is largely due) observed in his contribution to *The Times* correspondence:

There is no necessity for private persons to discuss, at this juncture, details which can only be settled by the Governments concerned. Our business is to proclaim and to advocate the broad conception in general terms . . . what ultimately emerges must clearly be something less than a single sovereign State, something very much more than a league of independent sovereign States, and based upon an enforceable charter of human rights.

Mr. Bevin is entitled to the practical man's distrust of neat-looking

paper plans* and to plead that any programme taking into account "the realities which face us" will have to be taken a step at a time. Those not burdened by office, however, are no less entitled to harry and press for the creation in western Europe of "a real new European Power, able to apply the resources of all its constituent States to their joint recovery and security." The masterly article† by A Student of Europe in *The Observer* of March 7 set out clearly what is involved. We must set our sights for a European Economic Cabinet, that is, pending the crossing of the Rubicon of national sovereignty, at the least a permanent council of economic Ministers of the countries concerned, and, in view of the Communist conspiracy, we must not flinch from accepting the need for common European organs of public order. Nothing less will do. When the house is burning ordinary caution has to go by the board. Europe's house is burning—and it is not enough to send for the fire brigade. "The situation of western Europe is one where caution is death and the only salvation audacity."

* Speech of January 22.

† "The Burning House."

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

BY OWEN TWEEDY

TO-DAY Anglo-Egyptian negotiations after a spell of hopeful activity in Egypt and in this country in 1946, to be followed by a spasm of bitter publicity at Lake Success in 1947, are again in the doldrums. Their object is the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936; and the hitherto abortive attempts to find agreement have shown that the stumbling blocks are, baldly stated, first the defence of communications through the Suez Canal and secondly the future of the Anglo-Egyptian *condominium* in the Sudan.

In the 1936 Treaty the reference to the Suez Canal occurs in connection with the Egyptian sanction for the retention up to 1956 of a small British Force in a special zone on the Canal after the general British evacuation of Egypt proper. The Canal is described as "an integral part of Egypt" and "a universal means of communication and also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire"; and "until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of Navigation of the Canal," its defence is to be undertaken in co-operation with the Egyptian forces by British forces stationed in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal.

The incentive towards this striking demonstration of Anglo-Egyptian partnership was the rapidly developing threat of the Italian encirclement of Egypt. But by 1945 Mussolini was as dead as Queen Anne and political Egyptians began to revert to instinct about the Canal. To them it has always seemed to breed nothing but the threat of foreign interference and to be in fact only a physical embarrassment to Egyptian political influence without those compensating financial advantages which would offset the disadvantage that the Canal Company by its concession is—as it were—an international *imperium* within the Egyptian *imperio*.

The history of the concession explains this Egyptian outlook. The construction of the Canal was opposed both by Mohamed Aly and his two immediate successors who, in co-operation with the East India Company, had brought the Egyptian overland express transit services between Suez and Alexandria to a high and lucrative pitch of efficiency. The overland route was completely ruined by the Canal. And not only that: by the terms of the Francophile Said Pasha's concession to the Company, Egypt was almost scandalously despoiled. "Never has there been a

concession " wrote the British historian, Edward Dacey, " so profitable to the grantee and so costly to the grantor as that given by the Viceroy Said to the Suez Canal Company." The facts speak for themselves. Egypt paid some nine millions towards the cost of construction which amounted in all to about eighteen millions. In addition a further eight millions of Egyptian money went towards incidental expenses and the purchasing of the Egyptian quota of shares and the paying to the Company of indemnities of one kind and another. Finally in 1875 Ismail sold this same Egyptian quota to the British in an eleventh hour attempt to preserve the solvency of his foreign loans ; while in 1879 the Egyptian share—fifteen per cent.—of the profits of the Company had to be surrendered to meet the country's stringent financial needs. And three years later by selecting the Canal as his line of advance, Lord Wolsey bluffed Arabi Pasha and turned his flank at Tel El Kebir which led to the British military occupation of Egypt.

Indeed up to the end of the last century the Canal had been anything but a boon and a blessing to Egypt. But early in this century, as the ideas of Egyptian nationalism began to revive, Egypt herself awoke to these hard facts about the Canal ; and by 1913 Lord Kitchener's new Egyptian Legislative Assembly felt itself strong enough to reject on national grounds an international application that the Canal concession should be extended for a further forty years after 1968 when the original concession is due to expire. That thirty-five-year-old gesture of independence is now celebrated by Egyptians as a great milestone in their political and physical emancipation. And by it Egypt will become sovereign mistress of the Canal and its property in twenty years time.

But there remains the Treaty obligation of 1936 by which British troops can continue to be stationed in the Canal zone until 1956. This Egyptian sanction was—as I have said—a striking demonstration of Anglo-Egyptian partnership in 1936 in face of the Fascist menace. The question to-day is whether the elimination of this Fascist threat which was achieved largely by British force of arms, has also eliminated consideration as a long-term policy of the mutual advantages of Anglo-Egyptian defence partnership in our world of 1948. —

What is the Egyptian point of view ? In the first place, the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil is represented in political circles as an offence to Egyptian sovereignty. Secondly, Egyptians are fully aware of loose talk on the lines that if need be a British army on the Canal could be back in the occupation of Cairo within eight hours and of Alexandria within less than a day ; and this loose talk which has been as general in London as in Cairo has bred a load of mistrust that the British withdrawal from the Delta is only a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. Then to heighten this mistrust came the British argument that even with the best will in the world it would take at least two years of British effort to remove their war and other stores. The Egyptian reaction was a curt reference to

other British evacuations—India, Pakistan, Burma and Palestine—where similar removals were achieved in a matter of months. And finally there is the Egyptian strategic argument that anyhow the defence of the Canal under modern conditions of warfare—atomic bombs and the like—is no longer a question of any garrison *on* the Canal other than for local security purposes ; and for such needs the Egyptian Army alone is quite adequate.

The British point of view is extremely simple. There is no wish to infringe Egyptian sovereignty. There is no intention to re-occupy the Nile Delta or its towns. But what would happen, to quote from the 1936 Treaty, to “ the essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire ” if war from whatever quarter should engulf the Middle East, and if Egypt should disappear helplessly, behind for instance, an iron curtain ? And is the present state of the world such as to warrant Egypt jettisoning at this very moment the precautions against ideological interference from outside which were so perfectly effective in Egyptian as well as British interests against the Fascist threat of 1936 ? And evidence is not lacking of the infiltration of these ideologies already. I quote from a letter which I have just received from an Egyptian in Cairo :

Communism in Cairo is finding lots of sustainers and hard believers, especially the students of both Universities. Slogans of ‘ No Islam after to-day ’ were heard all the time during the last strikes. They are all for it and they don’t care what happens to them as long as they believe everyone is to become owner of the land he plants and have free treatment and education and work. No one knows what Russian life is exactly like but they all say that it is better than nothing. Everything is just like a Russian salad. We hope for the best and may Allah have mercy on the human beings he created !

The second problem to be solved by Anglo-Egyptian negotiation is the future of the Anglo-Egyptian *condominium* in the Sudan. The Sudan is a curiously unreal cartographical and ethnical phenomenon. The name in Arabic means the “ black country ” or “ the country of the blacks ” and the Sudanese until the middle of the last century were in the minds and language of the Egyptians merely “ blacks ” just as the Romans talked of the “ barbarians ” and we British on our exploration journeys of “ aborigines ”. Indeed in the original Turkish firman of 1841 from which the rulers of Egypt derive their legal claim to the Sudan; Mohamed Ali is described as “ Governor of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan and Sennar ” and the word Sudan does not occur. To-day the conception of the Sudan and the Sudanese is very slowly taking shape and the policy of ‘ Sudanization ’ is a growing reality. Nevertheless the population lacks homogeneity, and society is still organized on fundamentally tribal rather than national lines. In the north Arabic is the lingua franca and Islam the general religion. But two hundred miles south of Khartoum, pure Africa begins—pagan, nilotic-negroid with a medley of different languages and dialects. Such is the Sudan “ Macedoine ” ; and it is the common welfare of these wildly, and widely different Sudanese elements that the

condominium has to cherish.

The 1936 Treaty had confirmed the terms of the original *condominium* convention of 1899 with the addition to the preamble of the pregnant words that the primary aim of both the *co-domini* " must be the welfare of the Sudanese ". But the 1946 negotiations went further and an even more ample draft formula was initialled by which the primary aim of both the *co-domini* would be

Within the framework of the Unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt, to assure the well-being of the Sudanese ; the development of their interests ; and their active preparation for self-government and consequently for the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan.

The subsequent breakdown occurred mainly over a difference of opinion as to the scope of the right of the Sudanese to choose the future status of their country. The Egyptian interpretation maintained that recognition of unity under the common crown of Egypt was implicit whether the Sudanese opted for union or some other less close form of association. The British contention was that the wording of the draft formula did not rule out the opportunity for the Sudanese to secede from the Egyptian crown.

But apart from the secession issue, there is the major political and administrative question of the machinery of the *condominium* itself. As a régime it is an extraordinary device with only one parallel in the world—the New Hebrides in the Pacific where the British and the French have contrived a joint administration on a more or less fifty-fifty basis. In the Sudan, however, there has so far been a very senior partner—Britain—and a very junior, almost sleeping partner, Egypt. Jointly they appoint a Governor General who has always been British though his actual letter of appointment is signed by the King of Egypt and he rules the Sudan with the assistance of a council composed of the most senior members of his British administrative and political staff. The early years of the *condominium* were devoted to an administrative recovery programme after the thirteen years of Mahdist misrule during which the population had dwindled from some eight million souls to two and a half million.

It was uphill pioneer work and it was brilliantly undertaken by a devoted band of single-minded British officials under the inspiring leadership of Sir Reginald Wingate ; and by 1912, fourteen years after the final Mahdist defeat in 1898, the country which had hitherto balanced its accounts with Egyptian financial aid had become not only law-abiding but also self-supporting. Up to then and indeed up to 1922, the Sudan had had no articulate political problem of its own. But slowly Egyptian politics were seeping up the Nile and in 1924 the first signs of political unrest appeared in Khartoum and politics are now an important part of the life of the towns throughout northern Sudan with political leaders, a political press and political slogans. Indeed, to-day, the responsibilities of the Governor General are quite as much political as administrative. The execution of a

dual loyalty is difficult anywhere : but it can scarcely ever in history have been more difficult than for a Governor General who represents two independent nations jointly associated in the government of the Sudan "for the well-being of the Sudanese" but publicly differing most acrimoniously as to how the country should be governed. In the event in the more pungent political issues the Governor General has taken his orders from the British Foreign Office without reference to the Egyptian Government. This is as deeply resented in Egypt as is the British contention giving the Sudanese the right to secede.

But the *condominium*, however one-sidedly it has been administered, has been of great service to Egypt. In the first place, it has secured the southern frontier of Egypt proper. And in this connection it must not be forgotten that only sixty years ago Egypt was invaded from the south by a Mahdist army and that only eight years ago the tiny Sudan Defence Force with a stiffening of British troops held off 180,000 Italians from Abyssinia who had boasted that they would be in Khartoum and on the Nile in eight weeks. But the greatest service which Britain as co-partner in the Sudan has rendered to Egypt, has been in connection with the security of the waters of the Nile flowing down to Egypt.

The story starts in October 1898 with an event in the Sudan which was of even greater importance to Egypt than the final overthrow of Madhist power. I refer to the now almost-forgotten Fashoda incident. Two months before the battle of Omdurman in September 1898 a French expedition under Colonel Marchand had hoisted the tricolor at Fashoda on the Nile some four hundred miles south of Khartoum. In two years it had made a historic trek from French Equatorial Africa and the French intentions were to establish a new French colony athwart the White Nile and further eastwards as far as the Abyssinian frontier. Lord Kitchener at once hurried south from his victory at Omdurman to expel the newcomers and, hoisting the Egyptian flag within sight of the French camp, invited Colonel Marchand to withdraw. The Fashoda crisis lasted for two months and nearly led to war between Britain and France. But at the eleventh hour the French gave way and left the Egyptian flag flying unchallenged. But the crisis demonstrated to the world in general and to Egypt in particular that the British Government was prepared even to go to war rather than admit any foreign power to any control of the waters of the Sudanese Nile which might jeopardize the very existence of Egypt.

This political principle was officially endorsed some ten years later by Lord Milner. He wrote :

It is an uncomfortable thought that the regular supply of water by the Nile which is to Egypt *not* a question of convenience and prosperity but actually of life, must always be exposed to some risk as long as the upper reaches of the great river are not under Egyptian control.

And thus we come back to secession. Just a year ago I was discussing it with an Egyptian politician who was also an up-to-date and benevolent

farmer on the most modern lines. "Twice during the last thirty years," he said, "you British were almost starved out when German U-Boats got temporary control of your sea routes. You know what you felt then. Well, Egypt is like Britain and what the Atlantic is to you, the Nile is to us; and into the bargain, its waters are now so delicately harnessed as to make the river almost an artificial waterway with a control so terribly brittle that only experts can operate it. Under the *condominium*—whatever its faults from other points of view—we in Egypt have never had any qualms on the score of Nile water or possible interference. For the *condominium* has loyally preserved security and our Egyptian engineers have run their own irrigation offices in the Sudan. But supposing the Sudanese opted for secession and complete independence? Please don't think," he went on, "that we in Egypt are less keen on the welfare of the Sudanese than you are; but when it comes to the intricacies of Nile control the Sudanese on their own could never master them—or at any rate not for years and years. At best they would bungle it by inefficiency. At worst they might monkey it about to bring pressure—political pressure—on us in Egypt. And let me tell you this, if there was any hanky-panky—even for a week—with the Nile water from the south, Egyptian life and agriculture would cease to exist as dramatically as if we had been atom-bombed. We wish the Sudanese well but that is no reason why we should give them a stranglehold on our very existence. And we have not forgotten that the worst misrule in the Sudan was not under the Egyptians but under the Sudanese themselves during the Mahdist revolt. And don't you forget either that in Egypt all roads lead to the Nile and all life comes from the Nile."

I have tried to analyse the essentials of this protracted Anglo-Egyptian controversy—first the defence of the Suez Canal and secondly the Nile and its control. And to me they seem to be the real and only issues at stake for discussion between Anglo-Egyptian negotiators. How then can the vital interests of our two countries be secured? I have spoken of an iron curtain. It is in the interest of Egypt and of the Sudan no less than of our commonwealth communications that never should the two countries of the Nile and the Canal disappear helplessly behind it. Indeed the issue seems to me to be the same sort of problem for the Middle East generally as the collaboration and security problem, which is now being tackled by the Brussels Treaty, is for a Western Europe; and as such would it not be appropriate that the Canal defence issue be included in the larger territorial problem of the defence of the Middle East generally, which is a matter in which all members of the Arab League must be vitally interested? And no one would have more chance of bringing all these interested governments together and of seeing such a programme launched than Mr. Ernest Bevin who has been so successful in sponsoring the Benelux plan.

The Sudan on the other hand is a domestic problem and its solution lies

in domestic negotiation. The desiderata would appear to be first : that the control of the Nile within the Sudan should be vested *in perpetuo* in the Egyptian Government with the proviso—which already exists—that the requirements of present and future Sudanese irrigation should be fully met so long as they do not prejudice the prior rights of Egyptian agriculture and life north of Wadi Halfa. Secondly, that in pursuance of the establishment of Sudanese local self-government the Sudanization of the northern zones of the country should continue to be energetically fostered under the trusteeship of the *condominium* administration which should be re-gearred on a more equal scale of partnership as between the two *co-domini*. Thirdly, that the evolution of the pagan south should continue to be conducted at a tempo and on lines suitable to the less advanced social conditions which exist there. Lastly, that all political—as distinct from administrative—Sudanese questions should be handled in agreement between London and Cairo on a basis of parity. Here as in the wider defence problem, success can only be achieved by goodwill, by understanding, and above all by a determination to look ahead rather than rake up the unhappiness of past history.

Some fifteen years ago I lunched with a much harassed Treasury official. He had been “sitting in on” a meeting with the Irish Government over the settlement of outstanding troubles and when he joined me he was absolutely worn out. “Dev,” he said, “started at 1.30 a.m. and hasn’t stopped since. When we rose for lunch, he had just finished with Cromwell and the Drogheda massacres and he proposes to continue this afternoon from the Battle of the Boyne.”

That was the sort of mood that dominated Anglo-Irish relations for years and years—a monotonous harking back to the grievances of other days. And outside the conference, in the clubs, in the offices and, most of all, in official files Irish salt would be eternally rubbed into British sores and the process would be reciprocated with interest from the British side. It all led nowhere ; and unhappily, in connection with Anglo-Egyptian relations, an analogous state of things is to-day very general both in London and in Cairo. London says “ungrateful Egypt” and justifies the adjective by illustration from ten, twenty, thirty and even forty years ago. Egypt retorts with that wretched perennial—“*Perfide Albion*”, and dates it back to what Gladstone said—was it in 1884 ? The problem is to stop it all and to make a fresh start. For unless this is done, there is no immediate hope of getting the Anglo-Egyptian problem out of the doldrums of suspicion, mistrust and recrimination where it has already been drifting for far too long.

FRENCH LABOUR

BY MELTON S. DAVIS

IN the midst of the riots last Autumn, a wise old French trade-unionist refused to get excited : " Everything in France has happened before," he said cynically, " and very likely will happen again."

Since then events have tended to prove him right. The average French workman is once again putting out eighty per cent. of his budget for food. He went months without meat only eventually to find it in the market at exorbitant prices. Now it is butter ; when he can find it, a kilo at the black market rate costs him three days' wages. Coal is up twenty times on pre-war prices. The general cost of living index is fifteen times that of pre-war, while salaries are up only ten times. The worker has other reasons for nostalgia. In the 'thirties he worked one and a half hours for a leg of lamb, now it is one and a half days. Last year food prices went up sixty-four per cent. A French deputy said recently : " Liberty belongs to human beings before it belongs to meat prices." But his was a voice in the wilderness.

The spiral continues its upward climb. Since the Liberation rents have increased over seventy per cent. and landlords are asking for further boosts. Cabinets have taken drastic steps which, as usual, have turned out to be ineffectual. Cuts in government expenditures are promised, but bureaucracy grows apace. Each new Premier, like his predecessor, attacks the high cost of living with violent speeches—his next official act being to sanction price increases. " This," he says, " will bring prices down." So France moved from a " controlled economy " (which was in reality, a semi-free market) to a so-called " free economy " (with almost no controls). This step served to add over twenty per cent. to workers' living costs in the space of a few months.

Sacrifices still are continually called for but these manage to fall mainly upon the working man. Outrageous financial scandals are punished with light sentences and extra-legal methods comprise the French way of life for large parts of the middle-classes. Farmers continue to hoard gold and needed foodstuffs, doctors strike against income tax laws. Shopkeepers, restaurateurs, wholesalers, middlemen merely raise prices. But the *lampiste*, the French workman, finds his real income getting smaller and smaller. It is little wonder that he disparages every new government, distrusts each old politician. His leaders, from the Left and Right, have betrayed him time after time. To whom can he turn now ? One metal worker faced with new higher commodity costs immediately after the

fiasco of the 5,000 francs note turn-in shrugged: "*Voilà, maintenant il faut que les gros récupèrent leurs pertes.*" ("Now the big ones must recoup their losses.")

What had the CGT (*Confédération Générale du Travail*), under Communist domination, done for its 6,000,000 members since the Liberation? Well, on the surface most of their strikes had been successful. They were getting rises regularly; laws ameliorating working conditions were passed, more frequently under Communist auspices than through the initiative of any other party. Nationalization which workers believed held out some hope for a more secure future, began to take place in basic industries, mines, electricity, gas, banks, insurance companies. Social security and maternity allowances were introduced. Shop stewards were finally given payment for overtime. A five per cent. wages tax insured worker training, badly needed in industrially backward France. Older workers were helped by reduction of taxes, free clothing, lunches, medical care and lighter utility bills. Each firm of over fifty workers had to establish a *Comité d'Entreprise*. These were to look after social welfare in the factories, to be kept well informed on profits and to be consulted on direction of production and distribution.

The French worker for the first time was being made to feel part of the economy. As a result of this he was willing to accept the principle of the forty-eight-hour week. The average working week had been forty-five as against a pre-war thirty-nine; it would have been even higher if necessary materials were available. Production rose past 1938 levels and started to approach those of 1939.

There were a few attempts to slow down the gains achieved. The CGT and the other large labour organization, the CFTC (*Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens*) demanded a return to collective contracts. The employers' organization, CNPF (*Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français*) wanted retention of the Vichy rule whereby the Ministry of Labour set national wage scales. A typically Gallic compromise was worked out under which collective contracts could be arrived at but had to be approved by the Ministry of Labour. This managed to satisfy no one and antagonize everyone. Seemingly though, the Communist leadership had won the individualistic French worker to a group attitude on production, wages and general policy. Moreover, this policy coincided with that of much of the rest of the country.

The Communists were still in the Government—and still unchallenged in their CGT leadership—when the PTT Union (Postal and Telephone workers) struck on July 30 1946. The well-organized strike for higher wages took place against union officials' orders. The rank and file thought their salaries had not kept pace with prices. CGT pressure forced a back-to-work movement but several thousand workers two months later, under André Morguès, broke away and formed an autonomous union. That was really the first rift in the cosy picture painted by Communist

trade union leaders. In February 1947, the traditionally rumbustious newspaper printers' union hit the cobblestones. For years it has been composed mainly of anarcho-syndicalists and Trotskyites with no love for Communists. Also in the picket line was the Union of Public Employees, strongly Socialist. But the followers of the Lenin—Stalin—Thorez line at the time were still desperately striving for respectability. Communists went so far as to try to break the strike.

Communist Party heads were doing their best to keep the slogan of "Production, more production" in front of the recalcitrants. But other attacks were shaping up on the flanks. Led by the PTT autonomists, a Trade Union Study Circle was formed outside the CGT composed of over 10,000 anti-Communists. The CNT (*Confédération Nationale du Travail*) consisting of anarchists and Trotskyites began pushing their membership toward the 100,000 mark. Then came the Renault strike in April 1947. Purely wildcat in origin, it exposed the C.P.'s straddling strategy. Either they were a working class party plumping for revolution, or they were a *bourgeois* group of opportunists thumping for production and class collaboration. They were hoist with their own petard. Meanwhile the Renault movement spread. The CNT, by its own claims, launched an attack from the Left in the nationalized railroad industry. The popularity of this C.P.-disapproved step forced the party to take a stand. Manoeuvred out of the Government they hurried after the strikers excitedly yelling: "Wait for your leaders, wait for your leaders."

Until these latter two strikes only 267 man-days had been lost in 1947 by work stoppages. But the events of May and June brought the figure up to the amazing total of 7,000,000. From this point C.P. leadership floundered. Once out of the Government they could not decide on strategy. They relied on short range plans and long range hopes. They started making more mistakes than any party with its pretensions (France's largest at the time) had a right to make. They issued contradictory statements, called upon Lenin to witness their return to traditional tactics, then later reversing their policy and making a bid for middle-class support. Eight months earlier the *Politburo* had said prices could be lowered and wages raised mainly by squeezing the middleman.) The CGT went so far as to confer with the CNPF (France's F.B.I.) and completing an agreement with the employers which had as its obvious end the raising of prices and the bilking of the consumer.

Meanwhile, the public was beginning to get tired of strikes. So were many of the workers. Again it was an autonomous union that forced the Communists' hand. Métro motormen walked out of their jobs on October 1, 1947. The Communists attempted to outflank them and issued a call for solidarity, bringing out all Paris transport workers. The motormen strongly influenced by *Travail et Liberté*, a group of purged leaders, issued a statement calling the CGT chiefs "enemies of the working class." The public, for the most part workers kept from getting to their jobs, cursed

the inept leadership and waited apathetically for developments. The Government gave the CGT everything they asked for and issued a face-saving statement denying they had capitulated.

It was plain from the November 12 riots at Marseilles, that strikes had become a political weapon. The French word for strike—*grève*—had lost its industrial significance. About this time, the fallacy of striking for “more” and then seeing prices rise even higher came to be considered by a thoughtful few in trade union ranks. The French worker began to realize he was on a vicious merry-go-round. In December he tried to get off.

Many workers failed to follow CGT orders because, when they were ready for revolution, Communist leaders of the unions had counselled patience—and production. Now that they were too tired to revolt they were called upon to shake off their chains—many of them forged by C.P. mistakes. It also became clear that the Communists had relied on the CGT, *not* the other way around. In November, Maurice Thorez tried to attribute his party's setbacks to American “intervention”. His only concession to *mea culpa* was that this had not been seen and understood quickly enough. The growing rank and file support for the Marshall Plan further loosened C.P. reins on French labour. Added to this was the tactical mistake of not knowing when to negotiate the end of a strike.

Force Ouvrière, a group whose leadership was composed mainly of Socialists, decided to break away from the CGT. Granted that many French workers, maybe even a majority of those in organized labour are disgusted with Communist Party leadership, can they turn for help to one of the other political parties? The Socialists were against the November strikes. They were also against the earlier summer strikes. Yet they had stood still for the elimination of bread and coal subsidies thus increasing rail fares, telephone, gas and electricity rates. This, supposedly, was to balance the Government budget, on paper anyway. But it unbalanced the family budgets of many thousands of low-paid workers. New wage demands were the order of the day. *Force Ouvrière* was also against the November strike. But it had not been very critical of a Government which, including the Socialists, seemed to be aiding higher prices, albeit unwillingly. This was why the anarchists refused to co-operate with *Force Ouvrière's* December split claiming that the leadership had merely shifted from one political party to another.

Socialists received three-elevenths of the votes cast in the last CGT elections. *Force Ouvrière* officials will be pleased if they can get the amount of members this represents, about one and three-quarter millions. But already there are hints that FO will not provide dynamic enough leadership. One observer wondered when they would “go in for militant syndicalism” and stop following “*socialisme à l'eau de rose*.” In fact, one part of the Socialist party, the far-Left *Bataille Socialiste*, has walked out of the fold. They claimed that FO did not appeal to the revolutionary

spirit of French workers. "After all," said one of these rebels, "France was more concerned over the Sacco-Vanzetti case than the United States ever was." On the other hand, some middle-of-the-road Socialists viewed the split as an admission of their own tactical defeat. Although the CGT had had a non-Communist majority they had not been able to make their weight felt.

The Government has done what it could for the new labour organization. FO leaders met with officials on an equal standing with other labour groups. What is more, they were given forty million francs left over from the Vichy labour organization. CGT had only received two million with another two offered and refused.

After the first burst of enthusiasm, FO membership drives have understandably slowed down. In their present condition, it is doubtful if in a crisis they can muster anywhere near the same kind of discipline the Communists were able to do.

Several factors have contributed to the dark future now faced by FO. One of the organization's chiefs, M. Bouzanquet, signed a manifesto issued by *La Troisième Force*. This tied his organization up with a political grouping that is losing favour day by day. The idea that a party or coalition of parties should be supported in power merely because it is not at either extreme is losing ground. The concept of the middle way has deteriorated due to costly, ineffectual manoeuvres by its present interpreters. Another point: anti-American propaganda is beginning to take hold. Americans here have found that individual Frenchmen distrust donors of gifts. Therefore when Communists charge that America is sending food and merchandise with an ulterior motive the implication is right down the thought-alley of the Frenchman. It is only a short hop to linking FO, the United States and the *Troisième Force*.

Too many of the country's leaders are living in the past, applying variations of time-worn measures. This is as true of trade unionism as it is of other segments of the French economy. M. le Bourre, in his thirties, is one of the few younger trade union leaders. He helped swing his own union, *Fédération du Spectacle*, and others in the autonomous Study Circle into FO. M. le Bourre, an ex-Communist, insisted from the start that FO would have to use dynamic propaganda methods. He suggested taking a few leaves from the tactics book of the Communist Party.

What are the differences other than political between CGT and FO? Strangely enough CGT wants local Federations to make the rules, claiming the national executive body is too far away from reality. FO, also strangely, says that it is easier to adjust salaries on a national basis and claims that regional conventions only multiply the occasions for discussions and provide spring boards for new agitation. CGT will no doubt continue to carry members who have not paid their dues but FO cannot afford to. FO wants to abolish block voting and establish the secret

ballot. CGT says the secret ballot encourages *lâcheté* (fear of militancy). The CGT for the first time campaigned for price reduction rather than salary increases. But then it hurriedly went back to traditional tactics. After all, the party line must maintain that price increases are inherent in the quasi-capitalistic system that exists in France to-day.

Anarchists are still at work with their Committees of Struggle, crying: "Long live the general strike." Not yet quite decided is the CFTC (Catholic trade unions) which goes now with CGT and then with FO. Being an extremely intelligent, liberal organization, they are hoping their membership figures will benefit from the split. Still on their own is the CGC (Foremen's union). Former Socialist leaders of the CGT used to fulminate against them; to-day's attitude is silence. Meanwhile the dread of "*chomage*" mounts as unemployment hits various industries. Aeroplane production, films, dressmaking, hotels, restaurants, radio and electrical trades have all been affected.

Can the worker hope for anything better from his elected representatives? Well, he still has not reconciled himself with the Government. "*They* do this, *they* do that . . ." He has little faith in his institutions, all of which have failed him, one after the other. First the Church, then the monarchy, then the *bourgeoisie*, and lastly the "party of the working class", the Communists. He no longer has the fine glow of the Resistance to urge him on. The MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) has moved too far Right to satisfy any continental labour organization, even including fellow Catholics of the CFTC.

It is a sign of the poverty of other political leadership that the Communists despite their mistakes continue to control as many votes as they do. It would be unwise to under-rate their political strength or their trade union leadership. As far as the de Gaullists are concerned, it is more than even money that the General, given the chance, will dissolve the CGT and back FO despite de Gaullist worker groups. This "kiss of death" could very well turn out to be the end of free organized labour in France.

This shows up two flaws in French labour strategy. One is the lack of a trade union base for the political non-Communist Left. The Socialists, more concerned with sitting in the Government than seeing party doctrines adopted, have failed to mobilize workers. If FO really remains aloof from politics there can be no labour party as an outlet. The second flaw is the lack of liaison between labour and intelligentsia. In England, this liaison was brought about by the co-operation of the Fabian Society and the Trades Union Congress. No such possibility exists in France. Politically the intelligentsia have brought forth no new ideas. As one admitted: "We adhere to many parties and contribute to none. We only add an ideological gloss to cover the void that exists beneath."

White collared workers predominated at FO's first congress of April 12-14: clerks, *fonctionnaires*, employees of service industries, all fairly

well-dressed, fairly well-fed. One observer noted, "as many automobiles outside as one would see at a CNPF (employers' organization) meeting." Speeches flowed all over the delegates. But M. le Bourre pointed out: "We need muscles in our arms, not in our mouths." Leon Jouhaux warned them: "This scission is due also to the excessive passivity of the non-Communists who, fearing responsibility, allowed the Communists to surpass them in energy and take away official positions." Communists had ignored the *Comités d'Entreprise*, but then the Socialists had never done much about them. Now the Communists have decided to use them *à la Prague*. Strategic strength still rests with the Communists, controlling such unions as the dockers and the coal miners.

Infected with the same *malaise* as the rest of the country *Force Ouvrière* has made only half-hearted attempts to help itself. As a result February elections showed the *Fédération du Livre* (pressmen), transitionally a non-Communist union, voting to stay in the CGT. Moreover, miners' voting went eighty per cent. against leaving. The teachers' union, less than ten per cent. Communist, while leaving the CGT, voted against joining FO. The CGT is still the most potent union confederation in the land.

What has not yet become obvious is that economically France and the rest of Europe must eventually approximate American standards in wages and prices. A French worker's average weekly wages are around 4,000 francs (\$13) whereas prices are close to those of the U.S. where workers get three to four times as much. It is beginning to appear impossible to go back. For better or worse European economy at present is tied to that of the United States. American prices determine to a large extent European prices. The era of low living costs in France is finished. The day of low wages for Europeans is over.

Before these things get themselves straightened out, turmoil and violence lie ahead. But in this coming struggle for readjustment, French labour is handicapped by division. It is undergoing a process which it has suffered before; recrimination, division, weakness, peril. *Le lampiste* does not know where to turn. His head is full of ideologies, panaceas and doctrines. Will they help him to eat, to clothe his children, to live a normal, full life without fear of war, poverty or oppression? To-day, as the conservative *Le Monde* points out, again the French worker's *cri de misère* echoes through the land. Who will answer him, who *can* answer him?

(The author is an American journalist who has recently returned to France after a period in his own country.)

TRIESTE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CENTRE

BY ANNE DACIE

THE aim of UNESCO, as stated in its own charter, is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science, and culture. It claims to have made "an exhaustive inquiry into the tensions affecting international understanding with the help of experts in social research and social engineers everywhere as a step towards developing practical means for effectively reducing tensions which make for war."

By November 19, 1946—the date of the First General Conference of UNESCO convened in Paris—the four big powers, on behalf of the United Nations, had already decided that the burning problem of what was ethnic and economic justice on the inflammable frontiers of Italy and Yugoslavia could best be solved by the establishment of a small free buffer-State on those very frontiers, built round a port which in its geography belongs essentially to Austria. Note that the frontiers were known to be inflammable. Then ask why the educational, scientific, and cultural organization of the United Nations in its "exhaustive inquiry into tensions" sent a small group of experts to the vast and little-known forest regions in the equatorial heart of South America—to establish there a scientific institute for the promotion of world advance in international education and understanding. They were sent at a time of unprecedented tension in the stormy heart of Europe, arising from the convalescence of the ills engendered by conflict, and as a first essential project. But can a sudden swift remembrance of poor illiterate primitives living for centuries without progress or enlightenment in the "dark areas" of the world lead to stability in those civilized regions of the world where, if despair is to be lifted from the hot-bed of emotions now dividing west and east, there is most urgent need for positive co-operation. That despair was already grounded in November 1946, but so far there has been no suggestion that UNESCO should make a similar concrete attempt—except through the circulation of fair-worded literature—to safeguard the education of humanity in Europe through scientific assistance and practical concern.

What better site for some big bulldozing project of social engineering to build a structure for peace than on that small area of land already mapped by UNO as Trieste Free Territory? This short stretch of coastland lies at the northern end of the Adriatic Sea, its 321 square

miles on the threshold of frontiers east and west. Linked to Italy on land by a narrow and vulnerable strategic coast road, Free Territory is shaped like a balloon beside a mountainous hinterland which since the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty (September 15, 1947) has belonged to Yugoslavia. Neither the Italians in the towns nor the Slovenes and Croats in the villages of Free Territory claim ancestry as remote as that of the scattered natives who inhabit the two-thousand-mile insect-infested reaches of the Hylean river Amazon in a stone-age society. They live on a frontier with every opportunity for immediate inquiry into the tensions making for war, and every need for action to plant a world flag for peace. What more timely place than Trieste for a suitable establishment of a scientific institute "for the encouragement of fellowship and other personnel exchanges across national frontiers to improve understanding among people"? I quote UNESCO'S own words.

But what has UNESCO done? In the immediate neighbourhood of Trieste there are 348,000 citizens known to have ration books, and there are 40,000 unemployed. Numerous persons have entered Free Territory as refugees or political and illicit traders who have no ration books, adding to an acute and swollen housing shortage already enlarged by five thousand British and five thousand American troops, all needing buildings for welfare and amusement in addition to routine work and accommodation. On the east side of Free Territory five thousand Yugoslav troops "safeguard" the only agricultural land of Free Territory with Tommy-guns and tension. In this area it is impossible to ascertain statistics of the population with ration books or who are unemployed. The only co-operation yet discovered between the two distinct zones dividing Free Territory—contrary to UNO intentions—lies within the fields of medicine, enterprise and culture. But at no time has a UNESCO expert or social engineer visited Free Territory to survey such an obvious site for an international educational institute. The building is already there—a large modern white erection put up by the Fascists for a technical university, with the interior completed later by Allied Military Government. It stands out prominently on the hill as you drive into Trieste from the heights of Opicina overlooking one of the most panoramic views in Europe.

The view is guarded by a lighthouse standing conspicuously over the Bay to flash signals across the blue estranging waters of the Adriatic Sea. For visitors the lighthouse looks like the statue of Liberty built in keeping with the castle named after San Giusto. Every citizen knows that the patron saint of Trieste represented Justice. Everyone can see that the outline of the coast towards the east resembles an avaricious alligator. But must we believe even so that the decision to form Free Territory was taken by all four of the big powers to relieve UNO from responsibility? Examine the situation in Trieste. There are shipyards there capable of constructing 35,000-40,000 ton ships and some of the finest warehousing

facilities in the world ; but except for naval ships and those bringing military supplies the port has been little used since May 1945. Of UNRRA supplies passing through the port from 1945-1947, 1,038,400 tons were destined for Yugoslavia.

Tuberculosis figures in Yugoslavia have constantly risen since the thirty-seven per cent. increase stated in 1945, with eighteen per cent. of the population in Slovenia and fifteen per cent. in Dalmatia contracting this disease where it was hitherto unknown. So great is the fear of tuberculosis in Yugoslavia—before the war there were 124 trained specialists, after the war 61—that throughout Istria and the Yugoslav-controlled land adjoining Trieste local authorities have planned to build health stations and anti-tubercular dispensaries as first priorities in an area of completely war-shattered towns and villages which are still untouched shambles. In these clinics the only aid for the majority of the population comes from unqualified and unskilled students. (Excluding Fiume, there were only thirty-four doctors working in the whole of Istria in 1946, numbers since decreasing as political pressure increases.) In consequence half of the TB out-patients in Trieste are those arriving from Yugoslavia in urgent need of help. Large numbers of those contracting tuberculosis are children.

North of Trieste on the Italo-Austrian and Italo-Yugoslav borders there is an annual outbreak of infantile paralysis ; and, directly caused by war, thousands of the people of Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia need plastic surgery to eradicate disfigurement and to bring strength back to muscles.

A large number of doctors of various nationalities have come to Trieste, some as refugees, and all glad to offer help where it may be given without political danger to themselves. Professor la Penna, director of the big central hospital, ardently supports all opportunities for medical research that can be undertaken by the medical faculty in Trieste. He is advocating that research in plastic surgery, infantile paralysis, and tuberculosis should be firmly established as a necessary part of local students' training in the medical laboratories attached to the Ospidali Uniti. In charge of Public Health, British Lt.-Colonel E. G. Dalziel, M.C., of Allied Military Government, has imported considerable quantities of streptomycin, insulin, and penicillin, largely through American generosity. The British Council have sent medical text-books and dictionaries to stock the university libraries ; and the local faculty sponsored the first conference of gynaecologists to be held in Trieste last autumn with doctors coming from all over Italy. In February 1948 the faculty invited specialists in child diseases from all over Europe (including Austria and Hungary) for its second conference. Permits to visit Free Territory are not easily obtained, but difficulties have been waived for doctors with the help of A.M.G. The medical faculty feels that it cannot wait for UNESCO.

Foot and mouth disease, hog cholera, undulant fever, rabies and swine

erysipelas have long been endemic in the hinterland of Trieste. In 1946-1947 despairing Istrian farmers were driving the UNRRA animals, given them from Croatia, across the Morgan Line for Allied treatment. Lester Weil, a Florida farmer in charge of the Agricultural Department of A.M.G., had had the forethought to import a large number of animal vaccines as well as new seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, such as DDT, for the tent caterpillar ravaging forest trees. An agricultural research laboratory has already been established, but land development should not depend on the resourcefulness of one American farmer. Trieste needs a central bureau with regular agricultural radio broadcasts, farming bulletins, and informative leaflets distributed each side of Free Territory in Italian, German, Slovene and Croat.

Future timber supplies depend on wise afforestation planning now. Much valuable forest land in Slovenia and the northern area of the late Venezia Giulia has short-sightedly been cut down for a quick realization of currency—to gain Italian lire for the expansion of Yugoslav propaganda, but fatal for the future needs of Italy and Trieste Free Territory. On the outskirts of Trieste a large modern tree plantation is now being developed complete with water-tanks, sprinkler systems, and rows of rich earth terraces. A high wind blows over the stony uplands of Istria and through the draughty squares of Trieste in late winter and early spring; but the successful cultivation of the gardens of Miramare Castle—built as a residence for the unhappy Habsburg Duke Maximilian in 1855—prove that on a bare rocky promontory protection from the *bora* can be found through specially nurtured trees and shrubs. Lester Weil plans to introduce the kudzu plant which has climbed so miraculously over arid stony farms, preventing soil erosion in sterile parts of the southern states of America and bringing fertility to poverty-stricken land which is now rich in fodder and hay. Kudzu may be the key to prosperity for many poor Istrian farmers who have not yet heard of UNESCO.

Centrally situated within easy distance from Vienna, Trieste was second in musical importance only to the capital. The Triestini are among the most musically appreciative audiences in the world. Trieste Free Territory could become a second Salzburg. Major the Hon. Hamish St. Clair-Erskine, M.C., is much loved in Trieste for his work in the last two years to bring back the city's music. At the height of the riots and strikes that paralysed Trieste in the summer of 1946 old San Giusto Castle conveniently disclosed a rebuilt open-air theatre with opera stars billed from Italy. During the few weeks' season the city remained undisturbed by bombs. Slovenes and Italians flocked up the hill to the "court of militia" where, under the stars and with the Slovene hills lit up with flares for Marshal Tito in contrast to the quiet lights of a cruiser in the harbour, ten thousand people at a time could listen enraptured to Giuseppe Verdi's *Forces of Destiny* for which the ancient warlike walls were the natural setting. Many international artistes of repute have visited Trieste

in the last two years. Igor Markovich, Zecchi, Honegger, Benjamin Britten are very well-known names. The Arts Theatre Council sent Fay Compton, Alec Clunes and Jack Hawtrey to give a short season of British plays at a critical time in January 1947 when the whole city was tense with rumours of new peace terms. This example of British enterprise met with no adverse criticism. It was loudly acclaimed by the otherwise violent anti-British Communist press ; and every house was packed for *Hamlet*, *Othello* and *Candida*.

Art exhibitions, poetry readings, national songs and dances—all depend on local initiative. Last October an industrial fair achieved considerable success from the benefits of exchange across linguistic and national frontiers. The Allied reading room and well-stocked library of American books are most popular. Local university professors dream of an international university including faculties for international law, marine engineering, and modern languages. Football, bicycle races, swimming and yachting alone cannot develop character. Sanity in the young depends on health and opportunity, and a proper-balanced outlook on prospects for livelihood and adult education. Or what is left but *boule royale* or roulette ? There is plenty of room in Free Territory for lively business men, if given UNO encouragement. Should it be left to the British officer commanding Allied troops, Major-General Airey, to present a report to the Security Council of UNO stressing the dangers if Free Territory is left spiritually and physically entirely dependent on imports ?

UNESCO claims to cost its member States six million dollars a year, the price of one light cruiser or ten bombers. Until the ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty the expense of Anglo-American administration in Trieste was borne by Italy ; now the major part of expenditure (cut down to the minimum) is still the burden of Italy, the country which has lost Trieste. There is no other procedure under which Free Territory can live. But the price of failure is despair and misery stalking borders built for a third world war.

“ Here is a programme for common action to construct in the minds of men such defences of the peace as the minds of men can maintain.” Can you blame a ragged Yugoslav soldier or a young embittered Italian for thinking these are idle words ? They were expressly used in the report of the programme commission at the first general conference of UNESCO in 1946.

CONFLICTS IN EDUCATION

By J. F. WOLFENDEN

ENGLISH education is getting out of hand. There is so much more of it than there has ever been before that the sheer quantity seems to be overpowering us. By comparison with the position at the beginning of this century, the total number of hours spent each week by Britons of all ages in educational activity is immeasurably increased. The increase has been, so to speak, three-dimensional; in the length of the individual's official education, in the width of range of the activities now recognized as educational, and in the depth of the proportion of the population covered by them.

One serious consequence of this admirable extension of the educational field is only just now coming to light. It is that everybody connected with education is so desperately busy doing the present and immediate job that nobody has any time to sit back and think. The Ministry is working at rush-hour pressure the whole time; the officers of the local education authorities are overwhelmed by the administrative consequences of the 1944 Act; the teachers in the front line, from the primary school to the university, wearied as they are by the perils of war and the burdens of peace, are harassed by greater numbers of pupils than ever before with daily more varied and more strident demands. Now, if ever, do we need the synoptic view and the freshness of outlook which positively welcomes new problems as exhilarating. Instead, we are in danger of fighting, with unreflecting enthusiasm but with no strategic plan, a disjointed jumble of individual small-scale engagements on a multitude of different and disconnected fronts.

Because everybody is cumbered with so much serving nobody has time to examine the antinomies which are gradually making themselves apparent. By an antinomy I mean a pair of propositions, views or aims, each of which seems to be tenable, laudable and even desirable, but which taken together seem to be in mutual antagonism. It may be of some small help towards a constructive synthesis if some of these antinomies can be at least recognized and laid bare.

The first arises directly from the quantitative increase in the amount of education. On the one hand it is argued that this increase must in itself be a good thing. England has had universal compulsory education of any kind for less than eighty years. Before that only a tiny fraction of the population had anything like a serious or extended education: the

vast majority had none at all. Now for the first time all young people remain in full-time education up to the age of fifteen, the 1944 Act provides for compulsory part-time education up to eighteen, the Forces have weekly periods of education in "the King's time"; and there are countless varieties of informal education available in youth clubs, community centres and all the voluntary societies concerned with what used to be called "Adult Education". More and more it is recognized that if we want a civilized, intelligent, self-reliant democracy the only way to get it is by more and more education. The longer each child's school-life, the bigger the number of State scholarships to the universities, the wider the range of educational influences, the better our chance of achieving what no country in the world has yet produced, an intelligent and sensitive adult population. In the political and economic complexities of modern international society, there is no hope for a nation unless its ordinary average voter can understand what is at stake, unless, that is, there is open to everybody the kind of knowledge and experience which in former centuries was reserved for the few.

Nor is it only from the point of view of the nation as a whole that this is desirable. Each individual member of the community has potentialities which it is society's duty to develop. In days gone by a great part of these individual potentialities has gone to waste. There must have been hundreds of Miltons mute and inglorious simply because they never acquired the ability to express themselves, they never trod the fields John Milton knew. Now, although we have not yet perfected the machinery, there is far more chance for the individual of developing all his innate powers, because at each stage in his mental growth the opportunities are there, if he will take them. And these opportunities are not narrowly scholastic. Physically, aesthetically and spiritually, as well as mentally, the field of choice is so wide that every single taste or talent can find its proper outlet and development. On these fuller and richer individual lives the happy community is built; and the foundation-stone of the whole structure is education. Only by raising the level of education of each individual person can we retrieve the disastrous waste of past ages, and make the most of our endowment, personal and national.

But is it all quite as easy as that? To some ears the other side of the argument will sound more convincing, though less plausible. Granted that what we need is an educated adult population, is the way to produce it to extend by one year, or even two, the compulsory full-time school-life of everybody? On the evidence of the present day it is hard to believe that the millions of money spent on universal education since 1870 have returned any appreciable dividend. The standard of taste reflected in the popular press, the cinema and commercial amusements could hardly be lower. The mere fact of being able to read, quite exceptional two hundred years ago but almost universal to-day, has done little more than open up to our adult population the football pools and the near-pornography of the

bookstalls. Neither as individuals nor as a nation have we any grounds for supposing ourselves either happier or more intelligent than our great-grandfathers.

The concentration on the quantitative is fundamentally mistaken. By lengthening the school-life of every single boy and girl we are wasting money, materials, teachers' time, which could more usefully go to doing something worth doing with those who would really benefit from it. To increase the number of scholarships is in real life to do no more than to lower the standard of the winners of them. Moreover, every teacher knows that scores of boys and girls of fourteen are ready to leave school ; they will in fact learn more from the practical life of the farm or the factory than they could possibly learn inside a school building ; they will be healthier, happier and more efficient. To keep them at school for another year is well-intentioned stupidity ; they neither want it nor enjoy it nor benefit from it ; on the contrary, they become discontented, frustrated, rebellious and determined never to have anything more to do with books or music for as long as they shall live. Why not let them go, to a properly controlled industrial system where they will, in their own way, learn far more than we pay millions of pounds and wear out hundreds of teachers to teach them ?

The root fallacy is the exaltation of quantity at the expense of quality. We are so obsessed with notions of equality and uniformity that we finish up by imposing on unwilling thousands something they neither want nor deserve, while we leave ourselves neither time nor money for those who really are worth both. Of course it was wrong that in the past the benefits of education were confined to so few. But to-day we are making the opposite (and much more costly) mistake. Human beings are not born equal, in educability any more than in physical beauty or personal charm, and it is doctrinaire nonsense to treat them as if they were. By all means give to those who merit them all the opportunities there are ; so shall we establish ourselves as a nation, and so shall we make the most fruitful use of our limited man-power. If we water down the quality of what we provide we shall produce nothing but a nation of dreary half-educated nonentities. Make quality the touch-stone ; extend the quantity as far as ever it can be extended without debasing the quality. But stop here, for to go further is to do a dis-service to the nation and to the individual.

There is the first antinomy. Which half is right ? Which ought to be our national policy, quantity or quality ?

The second antinomy arises from the first. What sort of education ought we to provide for our young people ? In the welter of administrative detail we have submerged the problem which to the practising teacher is the fundamental one. Never mind, he says, about regulations and memoranda and statistics ; all these can be dealt with by somebody else ; my job is in the front line ; I have the Toms and Bills and Joans and

Helens in front of me in a class-room ; what exactly am I going to teach them ? In botherments about machinery we have forgotten that for the sake of which all the machinery exists. It is the content of education that matters, what is actually taught in an actual class-room. What ought that content to be ?

On the one hand it is argued that this is the age of specialization, and that if we are to hold our own in world-markets there is no time to waste on anything but making each Tom and each Joan the most efficient possible producer. Most obviously and most heatedly this is argued at the university level. We need twice as many technologists as we have ever had before. We need doctors, lawyers, parsons, teachers, research chemists, engineers ; we have a comparatively small population, and we simply cannot afford anything but the most rigorous economy in its time or the most intensive cultivation of its capabilities. Let us not make the mistake of supposing that specialization is confined to scientific studies : the lawyer is as much a specialist as the physicist. And let us not be afraid of open and avowed specialization. It is not un-educational to learn " more and more about less and less " ; in fact, it is both desirable and necessary, desirable because academic abilities are most fully developed by steady application to a particular and limited field of inquiry, necessary because life is too short for anything else.

Nor is it only at the university level that this principle holds good. If a boy is going to be a good gardener, or a girl an efficient worker in a plastics factory, he must be taught to be a gardener and she to be a plasticienne. Why not face facts ? If the object and goal of a particular boy's education is known, it is just silly not to bring him up with that end in view. We now have all kinds of techniques for deciding what the careers of boys and girls should be ; it is obvious and logical that when these are decided the education which follows should be deliberately designed to foster and fulfil the individual's capacities and potentialities. Those things are the things they ought to be taught.

But, again, is it quite as easy as that ? If the " specialists " have their way, what will be the result ? Already we see, at the university level, the consequences of their doctrine. Not only is it already the case that no two professors in different faculties can hold rational conversation with each other ; worse, in many faculties the sub-divisions of one ' subject ' have reached such a degree of detail that no common ground remains. And this is reflected down into the schools. It is all very well to applaud concentration on a particular field of inquiry. But in real life the demands made, for instance, on the intending medical student are by now so extensive and so detailed that he has no time for anything but physics, chemistry and biology from the age of sixteen onwards, unless a " reactionary " headmaster insists on some other studies to keep the unfortunate boy sane. If this is true of the comparatively able boy in the grammar school, who might be expected to have other and non-

specialist interests, what must be the effect of specialization on the academically less gifted ?

The fact is that we have abandoned the ideal of the "educated man". Overwhelmed by the recognition that nobody nowadays can hope to be a polymath, we have thrown our hand in and no longer expect a man to know anything outside his one chosen line. In former days a man was educated first and then learnt to be a doctor afterwards. Then the educational psychologists decided that the general training of the mind, with subsequent transfer to some specialized field, was a myth. So the educational system was planned (if that be the right word) accordingly. More lately the psychologists have spoken with a less dogmatic voice, having, perhaps, learnt a little more in the meantime. But the damage has been done, and it will take a long time to climb wearily back to former sanity. Meanwhile, we are producing thousands of competent laboratory assistants but precious few educated scientists.

Let it be granted straight away that we need highly trained technologists and doctors and engineers. But is not the really first-class man among them one who has some sort of sympathy, sensibility, insight, which his purely technical studies cannot give him ? To produce thousands of highly competent technicians will not solve our economic or professional problems. Width as well as depth is necessary ; and that can only come from a sympathetic regard for studies beyond his specialism.

Again, which half is right ? Can the antinomy between "the educated man" and "the specialist" be resolved ?

The third antinomy is the most fundamental of all, but so deep and far-reaching that we instinctively try to pretend that it does not exist. In its simplest form it is : should our national system of education be religious or secular ?

The secularist would argue that religion is really no concern of the school's. A child goes to school to be taught things practical and useful. Religion is a matter for the child's parents. If they choose to bring him up in a religious atmosphere, that is their affair ; if they do not so choose, that is still their affair. In neither case is it the school's business to interfere. There are still traces, in the appointment of teachers, of an outmoded state of society ; and there are lingering relics of a nineteenth century (or even a feudal) obscurantism. But official religious teaching is an impertinence on the part of the school, apart altogether from the dangers of personal persecution and individual proselytism. Leave all that to the parents or to the parsons ; at all costs keep religion out of the schools, unless you want friction, unhappiness and intellectual dishonesty.

Contrariwise, it is argued that without religion education is without heart or soul. The issue is not merely the formal or official teaching of scripture or doctrine. It goes far deeper than that. Either a religious atmosphere is breathed throughout the whole school or it is not ; if it is not, a few scripture lessons a week are neither here nor there. Nobody

supposes that there is a distinctively religious kind of arithmetic or French grammar, as distinct from a non-religious ; but everybody who works in a school knows that there is a difference between a religious and a secular attitude towards the whole of a school's life and activity.

No doubt the antinomy is a reflection of the indecision of the British people at the present time. We are reluctant to come out with a downright affirmation of religious faith, lest we should commit the frightful crime of seeming old-fashioned : but we should, perhaps irrationally, be a shade uneasy if religious observance disappeared altogether either from the national life or from our national education.

Indeed, all these three antinomies derive from unresolved disjunctions in the life and thought of the nation as a whole. Do we want quantity or quality ? Do we want bigger and better specialists, even at the cost of wider general sympathy and interest ? Do we want a religious basis to our lives or not ? A country's educational system reflects that country's ideals. For as long as these questions remain unanswered our own national system of education will drift without course, rudder or compass, and everybody who works in it will be desperately busy getting nowhere.

(The author, who is Headmaster of Shrewsbury School, is Chairman of the Headmasters' Conference and a Member of the English Central Advisory Council for Education.)

THE PITFALLS OF PLANNING

BY HERMANN LEVY

I.

THE popular argument of planners is that they wish to replace disorder by order, and those who advocate planning as a new economic system allege that in former days there was economic chaos, bad organization, over-lapping and waste of effort as a result of unrestricted competition and *laissez-faire*. The argument is not limited to those who plan without any personal or financial interest. It is also used by representatives of trades who are anxious to create a non-competitive organization of their businesses through monopolist combination. They wish to replace 'cut throat competition' by 'orderly trading' and give no consideration to the possibilities lying between the extremes of such competition and a planned economy.

The only fair appraisal which can be made of a period of (more or less) free competition must be related both to the commercial and social epoch before the 1914-1918 war. Previously, indeed, the idea of a planned economy, though visualized in some socialist writings, for instance August Bebel's *The State of the Future*, was unknown to the world at large. With wheat at 7s. per cwt., an annual percentage of unemployed of just over two per cent., a most favourable balance of payments and an undisputed rise in the purchasing power of wages maintained for many decades, this period should be remembered with envy far more than with criticism of its "imperfect" organization. When planners of all kinds warn us of the dangers of reverting to the chaotic conditions before the 1939-1945 war they should bear in mind that the epoch 1914-1939 saw the destruction of many conditions on which pre-1914 prosperity had rested: a physical destruction of many countries; the disintegration of world economy by mounting tariff barriers and the nationalist policy of newly created States; the impediments of free immigration to the U.S.A. and other overseas countries; the inconsiderate concentration of gold in the hands of the U.S.A., the development through this of credit inflation in America and the breakdown of an artificial boom after 1929 involving in its train all exporting nations, and the development of inflation in Germany as the result of an uneconomic peace treaty. All these circumstances ran counter to the fundamental principles of world economy on which pre-1914 prosperity had been established, and if they all led to "chaos" and "disorganization" this only proved the case for a free competitive

world as it mainly was before 1914. It is ridiculous to blame a "system" when its foundations have been removed and its decisive functions paralysed. Yet, even under such conditions of a partially disabled system of unplanned economy the social results were not unsatisfactory: the overall picture in the employed worker's standard of living in 1938 when compared with 1914* shows that he worked seven to eight hours less each week; that family "real" income was up by thirty-seven per cent.; and the number of people to be kept was down by twenty per cent.; that "real" consumption of food per head was up by thirty-five per cent. and "real" consumption of clothing per head was up forty-five per cent. Not a bad show for an "un-planned" "chaotic" economy greatly hampered by conditions which lay quite outside its spheres of influence.

II.

The drive for planning before and after the 1939-1945 war is due, if we ignore the purely socialistic impulses and ideologies, to a very plain reason. Its aim at first was to remedy the critical conditions followed by the international depression of the early 'thirties and is now to redress the unavoidable impact of war and post-war economic calamity. The avowed aim was not to restore the pre-1914 structure which planners look upon with distrust. Ruined buildings not less than the disorganized state of every field of economic activity give rise to a feeling that something entirely new should be set up; not just a patching-up of remaining possibilities with a view to regaining by and by the old standards, but an entirely novel structure to remedy the real or fancied deficiencies of economist tradition. The idea of planning fits into this attitude for it promises to replace an individualistic, competitive, decentralized type of economy by a centralized, mostly non-competitive but pre-formulated policy by—a "plan." It aims at replacing the mechanism of competition and evolutionary development by a rigidly pre-conceived and systematically elaborated system. It attacks the old method for having been no "order" at all; and indeed, viewed from the angle of the planner, it never was an order. It was a system seeking an equilibrium by the hidden hand of uncontrolled economic forces.

But is this not "order"? It was, after all, the system on which the progress of wealth and civilization was built ever since, in the eighteenth century, the old "order" of mercantilism, the guilds and town corporations, was discarded. One could just as well pretend that a free lance writer was no writer at all. It is true that this order originated as a principle from the somewhat unreal conception of competitive struggles which through some mysterious, probably holy, law would in the long run be to the benefit of mankind. This was the interpretation of individualism by the representatives of moral philosophy of whom Adam Smith was one. In his view it was not necessary for a man to make

*See Mark Abrams: *The Condition of the British People, 1911-1945*, page 86.

well-being or happiness his object ; if he only followed his instinct, so far as law and morality would allow, experience would show that both his own advantage and the well-being of society followed in the natural course of events. This was certainly the reverse of planning. But "instinct" as the beneficial economic motor in our scientific epoch should not be considered as an unassessable, obscure factor in economic life.* It has come to be recognized in modern economics and business life as a very real and explicable factor of the economic mechanism. The "hidden hand" is no longer shrouded in mystery. The trade in futures, for instance, is nothing less than the practical application of instincts to the attainment of the fairest possible price level. It stands, of course, in sharp contrast to the aim of determining by cost calculations what the "right" price should be—an aim of which the hopelessness was recently confirmed by the official statement that "there has not yet been evolved a technique which solves satisfactorily the essential problem of how, in the absence of free competition, to settle the "right price" to be paid for a particular article.† But the price mechanism as we know it on free markets, and futures trading in particular, settled the problem. The "bears" and the "bulls" with their pessimistic and optimistic vision, their individual "feeling" for the things to come, this individual flair called "hunches" in the buying of textiles, provide the means of arriving at average price levels which come as near as possible to a correct equilibrium of supply and demand.

It was the distortion of world trade, the exchange restrictions limiting the effectiveness of arbitration, the conditions of general economic instability, of over-production and under-consumption which during the inter-war years paralysed the adjusting functions of futures trading and brought about the restriction and buffer pool schemes and other proposals to replace free trade by planned economy.‡ But this does not disprove the usefulness of "bears" and "bulls" in normal times nor the system of price determination by competition. Some fifty years ago German agrarians succeeded in abolishing the trade in grain futures by which, as they contended, corn traders were depressing the producers' prices. It was not very long before such dealings were re-established as their prohibition had obviously resulted in heavy fluctuations of the seasonal prices for agricultural products, the safety valve of speculation having been removed. The "hidden hand" which provides an equilibrium by assessing as correctly as possible the hopeful prospects as well as the risk of developments is the plain result of commercial psychology.

In the sphere of manufacture and retail distribution the system of unplanned competition is accused of resulting in wasteful over-production.

*For a recent interesting review of the ethical and philosophical side of economic liberalism see Margaret Macpherson, *The Philosophical Foundations of Free Trade*. The Free Trade Union. 1947.

†See Fourteenth Report of the Select Committee of National Expenditure, 1943, page 15.

‡See for interesting details Gerda Blau, "Wool in the World Economy," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*. 1946.

Planners claim that their systems of rationalization and concentration will exclude such developments. But, as a matter of fact, concentration of units had been progressing—for good or evil, for it may lead to monopolist organization—through action by manufacturers themselves long before we heard about planning. In the period when the much accused system of un-planned economy was at its height the number of blast furnaces was reduced from 629 in 1865 to 338 in 1913 while the production of pig iron simultaneously increased from 6.3 million to 10.2 million tons. This was not achieved by planning committees but by the common sense of private industrialists. But when in the 'twenties some sort of "rationalization fever" broke out, fostered by planners of all kinds, the effect became detrimental enough to make Professor D. H. Macgregor exclaim that "they rode the horse of rationalization harder than the pace of industry could keep up with it." England was lucky that in its conception of "rationalization" it had not gone as far as the United States and Germany and, therefore, felt the setback less severely than both these countries.

But, after all, the original impetus for larger industrial units, amalgamations, concentration of efficiency and vertical combination came from industrialists and not from official or un-official planners. That it was less in the British coal industry than should be logically expected was mainly due to the fact that the structure of British coal production is characterized by a great diversity of coal as well as of coal mines; smaller mines, as any mining engineer will be able to confirm, are sometimes those where both conditions of labour and efficiency are unsurpassed while the larger ones may sometimes fall considerably below the best standard in both respects.* Even Political and Economic Planning (PEP) cannot avoid striking a cautious note on the social effects of re-grouping of production units.† As to retail distribution there may be an overflow of outlets. But consumers have not suffered by it. As long as retail trade associations are endeavouring to regulate prices and margins it is doubtful whether a "planned" reduction of shops would lead to the desirable result of reduced prices.

On the other hand such modern types of retail units as the department store with its carefully "planned" lay-out, the multiple chains, the fixed-price stores and the cheap bazaars are all innovations introduced by businessmen themselves, unaided by planners of any kind. If the latter through various organizations now try to canalize the modern development of stores into a general pattern by advocating a rigid division of shopping centres, concentrating the main activities in the centre of the town or suburb and leaving only the shops serving the daily requirements of customers in the side streets and subsidiary shopping places, they will once

*See *Coal* by a Colliery Manager, 1945, page 45; also Mr. R. A. S. Redmayne's interesting letter in *The Times* of March 27, 1947; also Trevor Evans in the *Daily Express* of June 11, 1945: "Men of the little pits get the big output".

†See PEP Broadsheet of October 24, 1947, page 122.

more exhibit their complete disregard of the commercial conditions of retail distribution as they have developed to the satisfaction of shops and shoppers. Will, for instance, the pharmacist in a subsidiary centre no longer be permitted to sell cameras because they may be bought in the central shopping district? Will the small baker or grocer be prohibited from selling sweets because planners think it sufficient if a side street is already served by one single trade sweet shop? Have they assessed the time lost by the housewife when she is obliged to buy in the centre what before she could buy next door? And what if the few single trade traders in a subsidiary centre left over by the process of "planned" reduction of shops use their fortified and less competitive position to exploit the consumer? All such considerations have no place in plans which consider their expediency in purely economic arithmetic.

III.

The characteristic feature of the "non-planned" economy is the belief that the common economic interest would best be served if all persons connected with economic life were allowed to use their individual gifts and their differing abilities as freely and fully as possible. The same principle applied to countries leads to the free trade concept. But from this idea of individualism also springs another principle: that responsibility and decision should be placed as near as possible to action. It is only through this nearness to action that the individual is enabled to use his special faculties and to realize his specific aims. This means differentiation; indeed, such differentiation is aimed at by economic liberalism as the great purpose of higher civilization. Planning proceeds in the opposite direction. Considering differentiation as chaos, multiplication of effort with its necessary corollary of failure of the less efficient as waste, planners advocate a unification and standardization of production and distribution methods. It is clear that such unification and standardization would immediately dispense with the services of individuals who follow their own instincts and vision. From such planning centralization of administration follows logically. Indeed, standardization is the precondition of centralization. One may agree that where through a natural process standardization of production, distribution or services has developed, centralization and possibly even nationalization may not be objected to. This may apply to railways, for instance, or to the milk round or to burial services*. But the position is very different where, through differentiation of wants, differentiation of production units and of the administrative machinery is still required. In such cases any attempt at planning can only be achieved at the expense of variety and flexibility of production and service. Standardization of production in the United States was only achieved at the expense of the consumer's choice; by

*See Sir Arnold Wilson and Professor Hermann Levy, *Burial Costs and Funeral Reform*, 1938, where communal burial is advocated.

erecting high tariff walls consumers were forced to accept American uniformity; the "success of mass production", as Lewis C. Ord emphasized in his book *Secrets of Industry* (1944, page 90), was coupled with "lack of variety."

The danger of such standardization will easily be realized in Britain where so much depends on exports to a great variety of countries with a great variety of tastes which cannot be bullied into acceptance of a few standardized styles achieved by bulk production. It is for that reason that the plea for planning has been perfunctory perhaps in British textile industries. The pitfalls here would be too obvious.

Planning, by placing administration as far away as possible from action—for this is the result of centralization—must forego taking into due consideration the regional, local or any other differences which may influence the economic structure. These, indeed, must be replaced by uniformity, however artificial. A good example of this are the Milk Marketing Acts. While milk is a more or less uniform product, which, as I suggested before, may be distributed in retail, as it has been, by a uniform and single milk-round, the production of milk shows a most disintegrated structure related to farmers of many kinds, near and far away from consuming centres, dependent on the changing commercial chances of the sale of fresh milk or its manufacture into milk products. The Milk Marketing schemes have tried to create for all this more or less uniform conditions, to iron out geographical differences, to reduce seasonal discrepancies and stabilize prices. The result has been the creation of so-called "artificial proximity values" and a host of complicated regulations such as the bonus for level deliveries, complicated pooling arrangements, a network of specific charges and rebates related to transport, depots, etc. But the most deplorable result has been, as the late Sir Daniel Hall pointed out in his book *Reconstruction and the Land* (1941, page 235), that the "Marketing Boards concerned with milk have adopted methods which do not tend to give the public more and cheaper milk." Though devised and "planned" to simplify and rationalize milk production and milk wholesale distribution they were immediately confronted by the diversification in the traditional structure of production, the pressing of which into their iron-clad pattern became the object of their multifarious and complex regulations.

The experience of other marketing boards has not been dissimilar. The latest Report on Marketing Boards, recently published, does not provide a more satisfactory picture. The result after an experience of twenty years is, as *The Economist* put it in its issue of November 22, 1947, that "the producer-controlled Marketing Boards did very little (considering their powers) to rationalize distributive channels—a fact which hardly helps their claim to do the job now."

It is the great defect of any centralization that it tends to flatten out any structural differences and thus deprives the individual producer, or the

local or regional administrators of the possibilities of meeting specialized requirements.* A student of incentives, Mr. R. P. Lynton, suggested that had the central authorities decided to use the procedure of local negotiation to the settling of increased working hours in coal mines much wasteful delay could have been avoided.† Such statements should be as little ignored as that of M. P. Fogarty who writes in his brilliant book on local and regional development organizations, *Plan Your Own Industries* (1947, page 289): "At a time when, by common consent, the weakening of local autonomy has already gone dangerously far . . . the Board of Trade has actually taken over from the local and regional development councils functions which these bodies were performing efficiently before the war." He suggests that this a matter of "administrative convenience". But as a matter of fact the desire to assume the exclusive right of administrative functions is everywhere one of the characteristics of centralized planning.

IV.

Planners ridicule the system of the free play of forces and accuse it of chaotic results. But their own schemes are by no means infallible to achieve the desired ends. On the contrary many planning schemes are based upon "assumptions" which may just as well be realized as not. The "Plan for Plymouth," for instance, devises in detail a grandiose planning scheme for shopping centres, but it is explained that the plan can only be put into practice if the passenger transport system is improved by new peripheral roads and enlarged traffic facilities to make the journey easy and pleasant to the distant housewives. Where the finance for this revolutionary improvement is to come from and when it will come is an issue wisely avoided. In the same way the Beveridge plan and the successive social insurance schemes are based on the "assumption" that a comprehensive health service will be created. But two months before the inception of the social insurance scheme it is tragically obvious that the shortage of hospital accommodation, of nurses, of doctors, specialists, surgeons, dentists, of rehabilitation centres and even of medical appliances is such as to delay the realization for many years of an assumption so easily made. Assumptive economics are, indeed, one of the most dangerous make-shift aids of planners. In other countries social insurance schemes have successfully developed their system of medical benefits by the decentralized machinery of local sickness funds, works funds, professional indemnity associations and contracting-out schemes in gradual compliance with the specialized requirements.

Planners are well aware that they have no means of assessing future trends of markets. You can, if you wish, "plan" production by legislation

*See an interesting Letter by an industrialist Major E. Beddington Behrens, in *The Times* of October 6, 1947.

†See *The Times*, October 17, 1947.

and administration, but you cannot enforce the sale of the so produced commodities. Fifteen years ago Russia failed to clear stocks which had been made for export and stored "according to plans made in respect of every country"* simply because the world market conditions had changed; this is a representative illustration. The plan had been based upon failing assumptions. The Report on the Agricultural Marketing Acts says very properly—and probably this wisdom is due to the disappointment with marketing boards—: "Enterprise and initiative entail willingness to risk mistakes. Civil Servants cannot afford to take these risks." But, as a matter of fact, planning when based on "assumptions" is taking a still greater and probably more dangerous risk to the nation. Least of all can export markets be planned, because they are subject to the ever changing whims of millions of distant consumers and to their varying tastes and requirements. It is for that reason that textile exporters in this country oppose the suggestions made by theorists to standardize textiles with a view to reducing cost through bulk production. It may mean that the goods so produced will lack markets while the home market—unlike that in the U.S.A.—is too small to compensate for a reduced world trade. If planners believe that they may simply devise the technical means of mass production while leaving the sale of the goods to free enterprise they are grossly mistaken. It is the market which determines production and not production the market and this will be so in particular when the post-war period of sellers' markets is over. This may also become the thorn in the flesh of export targets. What at any moment the markets are and what their future development may have in store is, as far as humanly possible, best assessed and foreshadowed by traders themselves on a short-term basis; only when spontaneous developments promise some consolidation and continuance should industry devise its long-term technical programmes.

The situation in the steel industry is a significant example; the programme now in hand was conceived at a time when the acuteness of immediate economic difficulties was not foreseen. A diversion of effort for a time to short-term needs is urgently required. But too many bodies—the Government's central planning board, the steel section of the Ministry of Supply, the Iron and Steel Control Board and the Steel Federation—are concerned in making decisions which thereby are necessarily made very slowly. Short-term adaptation, the essence of the businessman's success, does not fit into "planning".

In its inherent unsuitability to provide the necessary links between supply and demand, production and markets, industrial technique and a flexible commercial disposal of the goods, lies perhaps the greatest pitfall of the system which "planners" are advocating.

*See Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, 1946, page 266.

ARE THE WORKERS READY TO CONTROL INDUSTRY ?

BY J. T. MURPHY

THE question has a long history. Had it been asked of James Morrison who first put forward a plan for " a parliament of trades " as the alternative to the parliamentary system of the 'thirties of the last century, he would have answered most emphatically that " the workers were the only people who mattered and fit to run the affairs of the country." And he meant by the term " workers " the manual workers, the men of no property who toiled with their hands. This proletarian and manual content of the term " workers " was generally accepted. " Workers of the world unite " meant the same as " proletarians of the world unite."

When the syndicalists of the latter half of the nineteenth century used the expression " Workers' control of industry " the industrial manual workers were meant and it was envisaged that one day these would be so completely organized into industrial unions that they would be able to sack the employers and themselves own and run the industries with their unions.

This connotation of the term " workers " still lingers in current usage although it is no longer generally accepted. The democratizing process of two world wars has given the word a new and wider application. Managers, technicians, and clerical staffs, who at one time could not bear to think of themselves as " workers " now hasten to affirm that they also deserve this designation and no one denies it. Those who advocate " workers' control of industry " to-day do not think of a parliament of industry as an alternative to the parliamentary system based on citizenship but as a functional institution responsible for the running of industry owned by the community as a whole. They mean that each industry should be controlled by all engaged in it whatever their capacity, managerial professional, clerical or manual, and that the self-governing industries should co-operate together by means of a parliament of industry.

Nevertheless the old primitive syndicalist ideas and definitions persist in the minds of men although the conditions which gave rise to them do not characterize the situation of to-day. Then there were no nationalized industries ; to-day there are several and political power is in the hands of a Government and Parliament committed to extend the principle to other industries. The Government is also compelled by the circumstances of our time to exercise an over-riding political control over the whole economic and industrial life of the country. The private profit motive which dominated the economic and industrial life of the nineteenth

century has been eliminated from the nationalized industries which are subordinated to the political control of the State in the interests of the community as a whole. It is not too much to say that we are in a period of rapid transition from the private ownership and control to the social ownership and control of the means of production. But it is clear, I think, that the Labour movement which inaugurated the great change was not itself ready for and did not see clearly all the implications of the changes for which it would be responsible. On no issue is this more in evidence than on the one concerning the control of industry.

The Labour Government has nationalized the coal mines, the gas and electricity industries, the railways and road transport. The most striking thing about these developments is, that whatever the intentions of the Government, neither the people, nor the miners for example, are conscious of having become owners of a great industry. On the contrary it appears to them and to many others that instead of us all having become equal partners in ownership, the miners have exchanged their old bosses for new ones, more remote and more powerful and that they have become the employees of a new, over-riding, bureaucratic corporation backed by the State. It seems a better employer in some respects, having granted, under the pressure of an urgent need for coal, higher wages and other social amenities which the miners have long demanded. The article by the miner B. L. Coombes in the January issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* brilliantly illustrates the changes that have taken place in the first year of the new régime in the mines.

It may be asserted that there has been complete co-operation between the Mine Workers' Union and the National Coal Board. That the Executive of the Union has opposed strikes, emphasized the importance of production, indeed campaigned for it and succeeded in persuading the men to work overtime, and conducted its old function of pressing the wage claims and so on of the miners ably and well, no one can deny. But there is little evidence of the adaptation of the union structure to the new functions which should naturally accompany the great change in ownership.

I am sure there is not a trades union leader in the country who does not realize that once the industry in which he functions has become the property of the nation, he and his members are inhibited against strikes. Everyone is quite sure that the unions can, in the new circumstances, secure remedies for their grievances and regulate the conditions of their employment in negotiation with the new authority without strikes. Indeed from the moment they are definitely conscious of the change of ownership they become really more interested in production than in retarding production or stopping it. And why not ? Surely if the mines have become the property of the *nation* and the miners have become equal partners in ownership with the rest of us, it should follow that the old antagonistic relationship, in which it was the function of the union to fight the employers, would be swept away, and the social basis be laid for

new functional relationship of all, from the manager down to the gate-keeper, in co-operation for the production of coal ! That neither the Government, nor the Coal Board, nor the leaders of the Mine Workers' Union have prepared the workers, managers and inspectors in the mines for *this* transformation seems self-evident.

What appears to have been happening during the last twelve months is something entirely different. The National Coal Board as a great corporation seems to have usurped the powers hitherto invested in the private owners and stands in exactly the same relationship to the miners as the mine-owners did before them. Witnesses are numerous. The Grime Thorpe strike extending far into the Yorkshire coalfield and depriving the people of hundreds of thousands of tons of coal, proclaimed to the world that a new power had arisen *over* the workers in the mines. Never was there a more lively example of the stupidity of bureaucratic authority than this exhibition of the Board upholding its "dignity and authority". Never did so many leading bureaucrats, high up officials of unions and the Government make such a contemptible exhibition at one and the same time. What a caterwauling, threatening, bawling in the highways ! And why ? Because a body of miners stubbornly refused to operate a decision about which they had not been consulted in the making. And this was the year of democracy 1947 !

The N.C.B. was defeated in that struggle but the full significance of the battle has not yet been thoroughly appreciated and understood. From many coalfields protests against the "New Power" have been growing. What is wrong is simply that the bureaucracy of the Coal Board does not think of itself as part-owner with the rest of us, but as having stepped into the shoes of the coal-owners to exercise their old powers and functions in the old way of "class paternalism", as Carlyle called it. A similar carry over actuates the leaders of the Mineworkers' Union and other unions too. The Mineworkers' Union has certainly got in front of the others in becoming an industrial union. But its leaders have not anticipated and prepared for the new responsibilities of their victory, by organizing their members in the mines to pass from conflict to co-operation even though the pit committees of miners were there to hand ready for co-operation.

That there must be a National Coal Board no one would deny. That it must have some authority is equally incontestable. But it should be a *functional authority* derived from all engaged in the working of the mines, who, collectively, are held responsible by the nation as a whole for production in the mining industry. The captain of a football team derives his authority to direct the team from the willing co-operation of all the team, and not from any extraneous power over the players. That is what I mean by functional authority. Hitherto the functional authority within industry has been vested in the property relations and these have been based on one form or another of private property. Now the mine

workers are ostensibly common owners, with us, of the mining industry. If such is really the case then the relationship of the N.C.B. to all engaged in coal production should be similar in kind to that of the relationship of the captain of the football team to the rest of the players, and its authority should be derived from the "team" acting in co-operation.

To suggest for a single moment that the workers in industry have become so mechanized, stupid and dumb that they are incapable of doing in co-operation, as free men and as equal partners with the rest of us in national ownership, what they have been doing under the pressure of circumstance and the discipline imposed by economic and political enemies, is to flout all experience. The Government should beware lest the people become convinced that what they appear to be doing under the banner of "National Ownership" is a huge swindle, and discover that, instead of the *people* owning the mines, the railways and other concerns, the real owners and controllers of industry turn out to be the corporations of bureaucrats, including all the old personnel of managerial authority, which ruled the workers previously, now backed by the power of the State. As yet we are in the early stages of the change-over from private ownership to national or social ownership and there is time for the Government and the Boards to prove otherwise. The check lies not in the House of Commons and Mr. Morrison rightly refused to allow the National Boards to be subject to a fiat of criticism from the House of Commons. Nor is it in whether there are enough ready-made managers in the bureaucracy of the trade unions waiting to be selected to a new bureaucratic oligarchy. The real test lies in the extent to which the nationalized industries begin to function as organizations of free partners in ownership, pooling and organizing their skill and common wisdom, as self-governing industries, in the most efficient and fruitful organization of the productive process.

The forms of this new mode of common participation in responsibility for production have already been shown to us in the widespread development of "joint production committees of workers and management"—in the mines the "pit committees". It is significant that these organizations in the first place were not formed on the initiative of the Government or even the trades union executives. They were formed on the initiative of the workers in the factories, mills and mines, in response to the fight for life against the external enemy. They were certainly welcomed by the trades union leaders and the Government of the day because of this common purpose. At first they met with the resistance of many employers and those who did accept, more frequently than not, accepted them reluctantly.

I well remember a young works manager, politically a Tory, telling a committee of shop stewards of which I was chairman at the time: "Were it not for the war, I would not touch the proposition with a barge pole." But the war being on and the common struggle for existence having to over-ride the claims of private profit and property, he agreed. A "production committee" composed of equal numbers of the management

representatives and the workers on the floor of the factory met regularly and pooled their experience, to eliminate bottle-necks, accelerate the flow of production, bring forward new inventions, new gadgets, jigs and improved methods of work. It is true that at first both sides were suspicious of each other and the trades union shop stewards began to operate as if they were on another committee whereby to squeeze concessions from the management. It would have been easy to say at this point : "The workers are not ready to control industry." But it would not have been true, as the experience of these production committees has amply demonstrated. Once the workers and the management had been drawn into common action by means of the common interest and purpose, the life, activity and productivity of the factories completely changed.

It is worth while here to observe how these committees were formed. They were elected by "the workers on the job", and as the new principle of accelerating production superseded the principle of retarding production, the choice of men and women to serve on these committees changed. After the first initial experience in which old habits decided the choice from those who had played a prominent part in organizing them to secure collective bargains, they began to elect people because of their knowledge and skill in production.

Two things were impressed upon me by this wartime experience of co-operation between management and workers. Once the common purpose of the production activity had entered fully into the consciousness of managers and workers through organized consultation, one with the other in the factory, and everybody was taken into the fullest confidence concerning the work to be done, production improved in quantity and quality. The second point is this—the deadening, levelling effect of mass production and machine production which social critics and craftsmen have denounced as soul destroying for the individual, found its answer in the transformation of the mechanically levelling process into a conscious co-operative team activity of the group, in which every unit of the group was inspired with its purpose and everyone's part in attaining it. Power relations had given place to co-operative functional relations even within enterprises where the profit motive remained. But it was subordinate to the larger purpose.

The first year of nationalization of the coal mines has not yet established that kind of co-operation but only the co-operation of the central bureaucracies of the National Coal Board and the Mineworkers' Union. This brought us strikes and threats of strikes that were wholly unnecessary. The unity has to be shifted into the mines and into all places of production. In this sense, the workers are ready to control industry. For this demand is no longer the meaning it had when first the syndicalists put it forward. Then it meant that the working class should sack the capitalist class and themselves run the industries. Now it means and cannot mean anything else but the organized co-operation of *all* engaged in a socialized industry

as free and equal partners in common ownership.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, addressing a labour conference a year ago, said we were moving towards "the administration of things" as distinct from the government of men. He was right. But the way towards that will be very stormy and costly if the leaders of Labour work on the assumption that the workers in industry are not ready and willing to participate in the "administration of things". The workers are rather tired of being bossed by "Boards", preached at by politicians and patronized with "class paternalism" from any quarter.

(A former shop steward in more than one firm the author, who has written a number of books, has served on joint production committees.)

THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS RE-CONSIDERED

BY HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

(I)

THE classics of childhood can seldom be approached with an open mind and one is filled with something like envy for the lady who, seeing a book called *The Pilgrim's Progress* on sale in one of our great book-shops at Christmas, asked the manager : " Has it been well reviewed ? " (This is a true, not an apocryphal, story.) If she ever managed to read it, she would, one feels, be the best kind of critic to make an assessment of Bunyan in our times. For how can those of us for whom Giant Despair was some kind of relative to Polyphemus and the ogre who said ' Fe-fi-fo-fum ' ; who half-expected to find Apollyon among " the wicked shadows that go tramp, tramp, tramp " in the gloom round the candle-lit banisters of Robert Louis Stevenson's child going up to bed ; who recognized Vanity Fair immediately when the travelling showmen came in summer to a little country town ; who, from an old Victorian steel-engraving knew, as a panorama, the way to the Celestial City better than any secular geography—how can such a one ever detach himself sufficiently from the magic of childhood to see *The Pilgrim's Progress* as just an ordinary book ?

And that is not the only obstacle. There is not only the childish surrender ; there is the adolescent revolt—revolt, that is to say, not against Bunyan but against Shakespeare. With what secret revolutionary delight one welcomed George Bernard Shaw's great essay, come upon by accident in school-days and quoted to oneself :

All that you miss in Shakespear you find in Bunyan, to whom the true heroic came quite obviously and naturally. The world to him was a more terrible place than it was to Shakespear ; but he saw through it a path at the end of which a man might look not only forward to the Celestial City but back on his life and say :

Tho' with great difficulty I am got hither, yet now I do not repent me of all the trouble I have been at to arrive where I am. My sword I give to him that shall succeed me in my pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that can get them.

The heart vibrates like a bell to such an utterance as this : to turn from it to " Out, out, brief candle " and " The rest is silence ", and " We are such stuff as dreams are made of ; and our little life is rounded by a sleep " is to turn from life, strength, resolution, morning air and eternal youth, to the terrors of a drunken nightmare.

Let us descend now to the lower ground where Shakespear is not disabled by his inferiority in energy and elevation of spirit. Take one of his big fighting scenes and compare its blank verse, in point of mere rhetorical strenuousness, with Bunyan's prose. Macbeth's famous cue for the fight with Macduff runs thus :

Yet I will try the last : before my body
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, Macduff

And damned be he that first cries Hold, enough ;
Turn from this jingle, dramatically right in feeling but silly and resourceless in thought and expression, to Apollyon's cue for the fight in the Valley of Humiliation :

I am void of fear in this matter. Prepare thyself to die ; for I swear by my infernal ~~den~~ that thou shalt go no farther : here will I spill thy soul."

This is the same thing done masterly . . . Shakespear fond as he is of describing fights has hardly ever sufficient energy or reality of imagination to finish without betraying the paper origin of his fancies by dragging in something classical in the style of the Cyclops' hammer falling " on Mars's armor forged for proof eterne ". Hear how Bunyan does it :

I fought till my sword did cleave to my hand ; and when they were joined together as if the sword grew out of my arm ; and when the blood ran thorow my fingers, then fought I with most courage.

Nowhere in all Shakespear is there a touch like that of the blood running down through the man's fingers, and his courage rising to passion at it.

I have quoted this passage at length partly because it is still not sufficiently known, partly because, thirty years after I first read it, I still think that the criticism is, within its limits, valid ; partly because—a point to which I shall return later—it is relevant to a reassessment of Bunyan in this ' century of wars '.

The revolt against Bunyan (for it was bound to come) was an adult one. It was precipitated by a repudiation of his theological beliefs, strengthened, on the secular side, by what may be epitomized as a sensitivity to and-this-side-idolatry worship of Shakespeare and all that that implies, and, on the religious, by an acquaintance with some of the great mystical literature in which the soul's pilgrimage is described in other terms and at a profounder level. By this comparison, *The Pilgrim's Progress* appeared suddenly superficial, thin, clumsy, tedious and tasteless. Even where the prose was majestic, it was because it was either the Authorized Version of the Bible or a tolerable imitation of its rhythms and cadences.

Even in the extreme of recoil, however, one did not go as far as Mr. Alfred Noyes's bitter and partisan attack (which, indeed, had the effect of convincing me that Bunyan must be a great deal better than I now supposed) and one was still able to enjoy Macaulay's pillorying of the Anglo-Catholic divine who tried to transform it into a Tractarian book, made the Wicket Gate a type of Baptism and the House Beautiful of the Eucharist, so that " as not a single pilgrim passes through the Wicket Gate in infancy, and as Faithful hurries past the House Beautiful without stopping, the lesson which the fable in its altered shape teaches is that none but adults ought to be baptized and that the Eucharist may safely be neglected."

And now, having passed through these stages of a mental pilgrimage about Bunyan's Pilgrim, one is confronted with two reissues* of the book, each in its different way equal to any edition which has gone before, each, by its choice of artist, format, type, directed at different audiences, and one is half-compelled, half-cajoled to read it once more and to try to see

**The Pilgrim's Progress*, by John Bunyan, with illustrations by Edward Ardizzone. Faber. 12s. 6d.
The Pilgrim's Progress, by John Bunyan, illustrated by Clarke Hutton. S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

t with the virgin eyes of the lady who asked: "Has it been well reviewed?"

(II)

On the whole, of course, it has not. It remains "perhaps the only book about which, after the lapse of a hundred years, the educated minority has come over to the opinion of the common people." For a century, if it was mentioned at all by the critics, it was mentioned only to be damned. Cowper, who, greatly daring, praised it had not the additional daring required to mention it by name. If, in the end, the critics came to the conclusion that the book which stood third in its influence on their countrymen (the Bible being the first, in fact; and Shakespeare, by a courteous fiction, the second) was presumably a classic, their belated laudations might be suspected of owing something to this circumstance. The eulogy was less spontaneous and enthusiastic than the neglect.

This phenomenon—the *literati's* neglect and dislike of a book which has gone for centuries into edition after edition, which has been adapted in countless forms and translated into most languages (the critic should look at the columns in the British Museum library catalogue)—is of some relevance to any approach.

In judging a classic, we are warned, we are judging ourselves. This is true provided we go one step further and ask: judging ourselves *by what*? And the answer to this is usually 'by the somewhat eclectic tastes of a group of critics who first pronounced the work 'a classic'.' This explains why most 'classics' turn out to be, on acquaintance, dull and unreadable—or, at best, containing a thimbleful of gold to a mountain of slag. The most badly needed critic of any generation—and he seldom appears—is one who should look at the 'classics' with the clear honesty of the child who announced that the Emperor had no clothes. (It was honesty, rather than arrogance, in Walter Pater which made him refuse the conventional abasement before Shakespeare on the grounds that Shakespeare had written perhaps ten pages of perfect poetry whereas he himself had written one page of perfect prose.) Thus to judge a classic unfavourably is not usually to sit pigmy-wise in absurd and self-accusing judgment on the giant author, but merely to dispute the taste and credentials of the author's contemporary critics and question the validity of the parrot-endorsement of their views through the centuries.

But with *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and perhaps with *The Pilgrim's Progress* alone, this is not the case. Here one is in the presence of a masterpiece which generation after generation of ordinary men and women have taken to their hearts in spite of the critics, and what is at stake in one's own verdict is something very different from agreement or disagreement with literary fashions or academic lucubrations. So one's approach becomes not challenging but humble.

And in this humility I think one finds the key. One approaches as a

child again and finds—this is the miracle of re-reading—all the magic that was there in childhood. Bunyan's very defects, in a literary sense, become virtues. I had expected to find long careful descriptions of the places that are so vivid—of the Slough, the Interpreter's House, Doubting Castle, the Valley of Humiliation; of the Delectable Mountains and By-Path Meadow and Vanity Fair and the Celestial City. But there are none. For him, as we now know, they were all real places in Bedfordshire; he knew them too well to need to describe them and by this very restraint communicated them perfectly to me, who knew them quite well in Hampshire, or to you, who may know them in Cumberland or Cornwall.

As with the places, so with the people. To dismiss the giving of such names as Worldly-Wiseman, Faithful, Lord Hate-Good, Mr. Live-Loose, Giant Despair and the rest as the mere following of the fashion of Jacobean and Restoration drama and to say that Ben Jonson on the one hand and the Carolines on the other did it with more subtlety and wit is surely to betray even a mere literary insensitivity. Who except scholars of the period or visitors to the performance of a revival can remember off-hand the names of half-a-dozen such characters in the entire Jonson and Restoration canon? And who cannot recall a dozen of Bunyan's? Again his very simplicity has given them the enduring quality of great art whereas the others have sunk into the oblivion which awaits the academic jest and the fashionable entertainment. If the characters have as little description allotted to them as the places through which they move it is because they do not need it. Bunyan knew them. So do we. Everything is in a name.

This economy of style, which is the mark of all great writing (*The Odyssey* is a supreme work of art; anybody, given sufficient patience, could write a *Ulysses*) retains its effect even in descriptive scenes. I remembered, from childhood, the horror of Faithful's end. Having, in the interval supped full of horrors from Edgar Allen Poe onwards and seen every literary ingenuity employed to produce the effect of it, I wondered whether Bunyan's simplicity would fail. But—to me, at least—it does not, because it releases, instead of circumscribing, the imagination: they scourged him, then they buffeted him; then they lanced his flesh with knives; after that they stoned him with stones, then pricked him with their swords; and last of all they burned him to ashes at the stake. Thus came Faithful to his end.

The third point where the spell of youth still holds is in the story itself. First, last and all the time, *The Pilgrim's Progress* is a tale of adventure and fighting written by a man who had adventured and fought.

It has the authenticity of an autobiography, whether its adventures are spiritual or physical. If in the one we may also recognize ourselves, in the other we recognize one who knows what pain and fighting and peril are in actual war and is not merely a playwright providing patter for a fencing-match to tickle the groundlings. As for the story, it reveals Bunyan's mastery of the first task of the artist—the apparently simple yet infinitely

difficult variation on the theme: this happens therefore that happens therefore the other happens—which explains why there is *something* in all works of genius which appeals directly to children. Whether this quality in Bunyan will appeal generally to an age which applauds purposeless and patternless psychological meanderings as masterpieces of fiction, I do not know. I can only admit that I found it exhilarating.

(III)

There are three other aspects of the book, as it appears in 1948, which must be touched on briefly.

The first is that it is more comprehensible to the twentieth century than it was to the polite rationality of the eighteenth or the vulgar "progressive" optimism of the nineteenth. It was written in one age of crisis—the seventeenth—and it can speak directly to another, our own. The desperate attempt of an individual to escape from a city doomed to destruction has assumed more than an individual significance. In the personal sense, the apocalyptic atmosphere is always and everywhere true—as Claude Houghton has epitomised it: "The last sunset that a man sees is the death of the sun for him"—but now a universal feeling of doom enforces the personal apprehension. We are more *conscious* of our imprisonment in the City of Destruction and with that consciousness, Bunyan's allegory takes on something of the meaning which he himself gave to it. There is no Utopia for us to escape to. There is only the Celestial City on the other side of the River of Death.

"Something of the meaning" only. For there is still the question—and this is the second point—of the Calvinism which formed Bunyan's own theological outlook. Everybody outside his own sect is damned. There is no escaping this (which, as I have said, once led me to think badly of *The Pilgrim's Progress*). Nor can one take refuge in the reflection that it does not matter. It certainly mattered to Bunyan and it was, as certainly, a factor in the book's original popularity. But to deal with it adequately would need a lengthy discussion of—as, for example, T. S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis have discussed—the connection between the beliefs of the artist and the appreciation of his work of art. Here it is perhaps sufficient to say that the assertion that no Catholic can appreciate *The Pilgrim's Progress* is an over-simplification as true and as false as that no Protestant can appreciate *The Divine Comedy*. The solution of the problem lies in a recognition of the actual historical context. Once that is faced, the theological particularity is less of an obstacle to the non-Calvinist reader than might be supposed. The main drawback of the obstructing theology is its dullness. But beneath it there is a stratum which can be accepted by all Christians, in some sense, and deeper still a spiritual validity which can be recognized even by those readers who reject the Christian way of salvation.

The third, and last, point arises out of this. How far, on re-reading,

does *The Pilgrim's Progress* survive a comparison with other classics of the mystical life? Here, again, I was surprised at its quality. To treat this matter adequately would need another essay, but the two points I should like to make, without discussion, are, first, that it has a curious and satisfying quality of Englishness.

Mystical experience, quite obviously, transcends national boundaries. But it is equally true that the expression of mystics is conditioned by their national temperaments and that, for example, the present fashion of the great Spanish mystics has not always the effect intended on those to whom they are recommended for reading. (I am not, of course, speaking of those who are far advanced on the mystical way.) But Bunyan's account of his soul's experience of salvation is written in an idiom and with a restraint that makes it intelligible to his fellow-countrymen. They can, as they read, separate the essence from the accidents—a process, in this particular kind of reading, of literally vital importance and one which the ordinary religious Englishman finds it extremely difficult to do with, for example, St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross and practically impossible with, for instance, Angela of Foligno.

Secondly, the fact that Calvinism itself was a reaction against a corrupt popular conception of Catholicism—a re-assertion of the transcendent majesty of God in an age which had misconstrued the meaning of the ministrations of men—gives Bunyan's book a special place even among the English mystics. It cannot compare of course with the great Benedictine clarity and charity of Father Baker (which is, roughly, contemporary); but to read it after some of the English medieval mystics is to realize both its affinity and its uniqueness. And, if it lacks something they have, it has also restored something they lack. In particular, it is a corrective (however it oversteps the bounds in another direction) to the stifling Neo-Platonism of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, which, though written in Christian terminology and much recommended at times to Christian readers, is certainly not a Christian book.

These considerations are not meant to suggest that *The Pilgrim's Progress* is a great mystical work; but only to explain why I found my one-time revulsion to it on theological grounds mitigated on a new approach and to suggest that it might be the same for other readers who do not share Bunyan's creed. For those who do, there is, obviously, no problem; and for those who have no creed at all there are worse Christian apologists—though they may seem more orthodox—than Bunyan's "Christian".

Yet this will never be the primary appeal of the book. And in the end its secret defies analysis. It stands a much-loved work of undefinable genius and ingenuous simplicity to be accepted or rejected. Myself I find that I still accept it.

THE SCHOOLROOM HAS NO CLOCK . . .

BY ROBIN BENN

The schoolroom has no clock save twenty faces
each with its chiming jaws
and the fidgeting tick which frets thin time away.
All senses sway as the nimble brain retraces
tightropes from effect to cause,
balances by natural laws
one more unwieldy fact on the pile for to-day.

Each new conception spawns another query,
utters the squalling ' why ? '
to befuddle the brain and suffocate elation.
No savour lasts ; and the palate soon is weary—
sips the cups and puts them by,
votes them uniformly dry,
in mere indifference rejects discrimination.

* * * * *

In the greasy sink of the afternoon
five drops of sound clang down, so slow
that half the mind can measure them and go
before to the haven promised in their tune ;
and the body too, though it stays for the lazy word
twitching its postures to the showman's strings
and echoing whispered promptings from the wings,
leans outward to the hope the mind has heard.

* * * * *

Resort to mere mechanics of existence
(here is the key to the personal time-machine)
tomorrow is dimmed to comfortable distance,
conscience quelled by passive non-resistance,
and self escapes on the arm of secure routine.

The jostling shoulder bruises no reaction,
the face encountered conjures up no name,
no outrage now provokes the swift correction—

all purposes submit to that attraction
which homeward draws the body's empty frame.

* * * * *

The bathroom's veil of folding steam subdues
the strong insistence of immediate things,
water to flesh and flesh to water clings,
and here sensation claims belated dues.
In this still temple all their stories tell—
glad trinity of Spirit, Body, Brain—
and each is pleased ; while there, in soft refrain,
the water drips an echo to the bell.

CORRESPONDENCE

A QUESTION OF SYNTAX.

The Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

The difference between the reviewer of *The First Europe* and the Rev. B. C. Plowright, whose letter appeared in the April 1948 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, is really one of syntax ; whether the words " sees in medieval Christianity the norm of the culture of the Christian north " extends to the latter part of the phrase. Certainly Dr. Burns wrote that medieval society grew out of the period he describes, but in his last chapter he does not hesitate to point out its limitations, whereas Christopher Dawson, and, more particularly, Hilaire Belloc, give to the age of Catholic Europe a unique, hypostatic value, as being an attempt to incarnate the Kingdom of God on earth on the principles of St. Augustine. It is not for me to say which view is right, but certainly the appraisements of the Dark Ages by C. Delisle Burns and Christopher Dawson differ very greatly. The one sets forth the Catholic view, the other the Protestant or agnostical.

Yours faithfully,

HENRY SLESSER.

Postbridge,
Devon.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

SOCIETY AND MORAL WILL

By OLIVER TOMKINS

WHEN Mr. Middleton Murry travels, he travels fast and arrives with a bump—followed by a long explanation of how he got there. This time* the journey is from pacifism to the advocacy of threatening Russia with atomic war in order to end war and the explanation is long and full. It is impossible to summarize the argument, for the book is not so much an argument as variations on a theme, the theme that conscience is the heart of the free society and that Communism murders conscience. If the free society is to live, this intolerable threat to it must be removed. So long as men live under that threat, all creativity, all values are stifled. If Russia is frankly faced with the ultimatum of the democracies that they will declare war, whilst they still have atomic advantage, unless Russia freely agrees to join an international atomic development and control system, then the odds are that the 'war to end war' may need to go no further than a threat. However, the odds are perilous, because the Russian rulers realize that to open their frontiers is to destroy the supremacy of their tyranny. Even so—the condition of the survival of the free society is the destruction of Communism, whether it is destroyed by the Russian people co-operating with the democracies against their tyrants or by the democracies destroying the Russian tyrants and their helpless people with them. At all costs and one way or the other the free society must be preserved, because it is the Kingdom of God on earth (p. 127). Any other way lie only darkness and destruction of the spirit.

But such a crude summary of the theme does not do sufficient justice to the richness and profundity of the variations. For this is an immensely rich and rewarding book. It has always been the characteristic of Mr. Middleton Murry's writing that he cries out from the deep places of the spirit, destroying our complacency, importuning our company through Inferno and Purgatory, in the search for Paradise. This is a deeply contemporary book, a vivid demonstration of the costly engagement which the spiritual mind of our time must undertake if it will live. As a piece of political theory, it grapples courageously with the central problem of all politics worthy of the name, the relating of society to the moral will.

For these reasons it is not an easy book. It is too aware of the dissolution of old landmarks, too concerned with the need for radical re-statement, to be read without a good deal of sustained attention and a readiness both to grapple with close logic and to seek patiently the meaning of familiar words in unfamiliar settings. In this latter, Mr. Murry often makes things unnecessarily difficult for some of his readers. Concerned as he is with the ultimate problems of God and man, Mr. Murry is talking theology. But the technically trained theologian is constantly baffled by finding the recognized terms of his trade being used in purely arbitrary and individual ways. For example, the phrase "the free society depends upon God and God depends upon the free society" is meaningless in its latter half if the word "God" carries the unconditioned meaning which theology gives it. If it has any meaning, it must be that the free society depends upon man's knowledge of God and that man's knowledge of God depends upon the existence of the free society—a contention which is powerfully and salutarily elaborated (p. 226 ff.) in a passage denouncing the thesis that, in the monolithic totalitarian State,

**The Free Society*, by John Middleton Murry. Dakers, 12s. 6d.

Christianity can endure "in the catacombs", and in the frightening, and frightened, chapter "Is Conscience Annihilable?" But many readers will feel that they would like to know a good deal more about the quality of the Christian Church, which had already survived a generation of persecution in the U.S.S.R. before it was "restored" in 1942, before they accept Mr. Murry's answer to this question.

But it is not the author's handling of Christian words which arouses deepest misgiving. It is the suspicion that he has not grasped their content. There is a dimension missing from Mr. Murry's thought, what the Gospel calls *skandalon*, that hard particularity which is nowhere clearer than in the most "spiritual Gospel", the Fourth. Or, to put it another way, Christianity is concerned with the fact that the Word became flesh; Mr. Murry is concerned with ideas. Christianity is forever wrestling with the eternal redeeming the finite and limited. Mr. Murry is forever slipping off into the infinite and ultimate. Take his attitude to this possible 'war to end war'. He writes of it with exaltation; it will be wholly different from all other wars. He bestows upon it a justification qualitatively different from those "just wars" in which the Christian man believes, with a heavy heart and a reluctant hand, that it is lawful for him to bear arms. War is *always* sordid, bestial, a fruit of sin, even this "last war" of them all.

So with the free society itself. We cannot be too grateful to Mr. Murry for opening our eyes to the dimensions of the moral effort—no, deeper, the revolution of human culture—which are required if mankind is to survive in the new chapter of its history. But to talk of the free society as the Kingdom of God is to lose the tension of finite and infinite, of sin and redemption, in which Christianity moves. Reinhold Niebuhr's *Children of Light and Children of Darkness* contains a more effective, because more sober and restrained, defence of democracy than Mr. Murry's political apocalypses.

Paradoxically, we must reject Mr. Murry's conception of the free society for the same reason as we must reject its great enemy, Communism, because both have made into an absolute, claiming the unconditioned obedience of men, the ambiguous, relative achievements of man in history. This is not, for one moment, to say that the choice between them is not a matter of life and death—even in certain circumstances, a matter of damnation and salvation. But the salvation lies not in the choice but in the choosing. Grant that Mr. Murry has justified his claim (and it is a claim to be most carefully weighed) that "the free society is nothing else than the vehicle of conscience. Take conscience away from the free society; it dies instantly. Add conscience to the Communist society; it will kill it instantly." Grant even that, and the free society will still remain a finite and partial achievement, in which conscience has still to bow before a still transcendent God. Perhaps this is what he means when he says that the free society is the most crucial "experiment" man has ever made (p. 190), but it is not clear that it is his meaning.

Mr. Murry has some trenchant, and deserved, observations on the political irrelevance of pacifism. But pacifists are at least a reminder of the limitation of the moral claims of politics. Possibly Middleton Murry the pacifist was more politically relevant than the Murry who has abandoned pacifism for politics.

A CASE HISTORY OF JAPAN, by Francis J. Horner. *Sheed and Ward.* 10s. 6d.

In the past ten years at least ten times as many books have been published repeating in various keys the story of Japan's rise and fall. The peculiar merit of Mr. Horner's profoundly interesting book is that he shows us

how these things happened and how the Japanese have become what they are. Mr. Horner's fourteen years of teaching in a Japanese university were the pleasantest in his life. No people, he says, are more courteous, kind and generous than the Japanese; yet none can, on occasion, be "so exasperating, offensive, unreliable and generally im-

possible." Both statements are perfectly true.

Much is due to the former Japanese boast that they had never been invaded, a source of strength in promoting unity in war, but of weakness in that they have never known the infusion of new blood which propagates "new thoughts and ideologies from within the people themselves." For 250 years the Tokugawa Shoguns cut Japan off from contact with the momentous world changes then occurring; and for hundreds of years Shinto and ancestor worship "have treated the people precisely as though they were in the nursery" riveting upon them a "herd instinct", terror of asserting individuality, and a submissiveness to external authority which made them as clay in the hands of military oligarchs.

In such training, combined with the mystic belief in *Yamato damashii*, a peculiar spiritual essence inherent in every Japanese, the position of the Emperor as head of the whole Japanese family (and also its high priest) developed naturally. That Hirohito has in nowise lost caste with his people by repudiating his divinity is evident; and it is interesting to note, in recent weeks, the marked revival of Shinto ceremonial, no doubt in revolt against American-taught democracy, which the Japanese simply cannot (and one may venture to add) will never understand.

Buddhism is chiefly conspicuous by the richness it has imparted to art and literature, while Zen Buddhism specially appealed to soldiers by its elaboration of the self-discipline which is ground into every Japanese from childhood. Yet, as in China, Buddhism provides a means of spiritual consolation of which every visitor to the temples of Nara and Kyoto can see that the Japanese make daily use. It is to the undoubtedly deep religious strain in the Japanese nature that Mr. Horner looks (as General MacArthur does) for Japan's ultimate redemption through Christianity from her present lost, bewildered

frame of mind. How this can be achieved, on the basis of the best principles in Japanese life, is sketched out in the closing pages of an altogether exceptional book.

O. M. GREEN.

BALTIC ECLIPSE, by Ants Oras.
Gollancz. 15s.

HARPER OF HEAVEN, by Robert Service. *Benn. 15s.*

If only the three Baltic States had been situated elsewhere they would certainly have enjoyed a far more happy existence, but with Russia and Germany as neighbours their lot has been unenviable. Mr. Oras, who was persecuted by those powers as an Anglophil, is now fortunately on the staff of the Bodleian and it may be doubted whether among those millions of books there is one more tragic than his wherein the story of his people is very clearly and interestingly depicted.

When the three States entered upon a pact of mutual assistance, fully approved of by the Kremlin, it was suddenly found by that mysterious authority that the pact constituted a serious menace to the safety of the U.S.S.R., a menace which could only be met by complete military occupation. There would indeed have been a menace if freedom of action prevailed in Russia, for the prosperity of, for instance, Estonia compared strikingly with the ragged, down-at-heel appearance of Russian towns. However the political commissars explained that Estonia had been subsidized by the entire capitalist world as a showpiece so as to be used to undermine the morale of Soviet citizens. Presumably this undermining had been continued in the educational sphere, for when the Russians set up schools for illiterate Estonians no pupils could be found for them. The Russians themselves, that is to say the authorities, looked down upon the sort of lectures which Estonians had listened to in the days of their separation from the wisdom of Russia when, for example, they were unaware that *Antony and Cleopatra* is in

truth a description of the victory of the organized State over individualist anarchy and that Goethe in the second part of *Faust* is the champion of technical progress. Alas, there seems little hope with the world as it is, for these three admirable States to regain the liberty which they enjoyed between the two wars.

The Russian scene is also painted for us in a very detailed manner by Mr. Robert Service, the Canadian poet, who in this book tells of his wanderings through many countries. He has a most remarkable memory or else he has always kept a very full diary, for we learn not merely the conversations in which he took part many years ago, but what he had to eat night after night. However caviare, roast chicken and ice cream did not serve to blind him to what is sordid in the Russian way of life. But his acquaintance with that country does not go far back; it is all very well to proclaim that for men and women to bathe at seaside resorts with no clothing whatever is a Soviet triumph over the old-fashioned conventions of capitalism. If Mr. Service had bathed, as I did, at Odessa before the fall of the Czarist régime he would have witnessed much the same spectacle as that of to-day. In the next edition of this book, by the way, let me suggest that the famous church outside the Kremlin has nothing to do with anyone called Isaac the Terrible, for it was Ivan of that ilk who put out the eyes of the architect when he acknowledged that he was capable of building one even finer.

There are not many inaccuracies in this long and fascinating book. Mr. Service is by origin a Scot and even a Scot, he says, would revolt at finding that he was living far below his means. So he bought his wife a bicycle and off they went on a tour of Touraine. His French wife had been won in a highly original fashion; she and the family, to whom our author is devoted, do not appear to resent his long and frequent absences, for it has been his custom to rush, alone, from one end of Europe to

another. The country he loves the best is obviously France; there, long ago, he met Edmund Gosse, who ignored him, and James Stephens whom, like all worthy people, he loved. Stephens would sing rather than recite his latest poem written on the back of an old envelope, chanting the lovely words with a thick brogue. "There are only two great living authors," he would say, "and the other is myself." He would not say who the first was. Hugh Walpole, then a young student at Tours, was too respectable for our friend who is quite ready to laugh at himself as he reacts in this way or that to every kind of encounter.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS, by
Hugh Shearman. *Faber & Faber.*
16s.

Ireland, to her sorrow, has always been able to arouse enthusiasm for her cause of the moment on the other side of the Atlantic or across the Irish sea. To her sorrow because time and again she has found that her champions have not taken the trouble to inform themselves and fade away when they find they are being taken seriously. It is not easy to get to the root of any Irish political problem. It invariably proves to be a complex tangled affair, striking deep into history, religion and the emotions. But those who would befriend the country should be at some pains to understand the issues before they delude the susceptible Gael into a belief that the world is on his side at long last.

The current delusion concerns the problem of partition. Incredibly, sympathy for reactionary Eire in her de-truncation is being lavished by British socialists. To the Irishman it appears as though a large and influential section of the British Government party is brimful of facile notions for doing away with the border. It is greatly to be hoped that this manifestation will not be taken too seriously. Obviously, few of these fervent anti-partitionists have

studied the implications.

For students of this and other Irish questions Dr. Shearman's book should become a standard work. Especially so on partition, since it does what has not been done before in presenting a reasonable and historically-inspired case from the Northern Ireland point of view. So far, all the argument seems to have come from the South, the anti-partitionist side of the border. It is quite time that the partitionist Northerner realized that if he has a case he must put it and the putting of it must be of a more reasoned nature than is customary in Orange orations on the Twelfth of July. His Southern fellow-countrymen are an importunate lot and have a habit of getting their own way. They certainly will not see the day lost for the want of argument.

Thus Dr. Shearman's advocacy is timely. His book is essentially partitionist in theme, for he sees the border not as a necessary compromise but as

the natural and inevitable result of the geographical, historical and social background. Within the limits of a comparatively short work he depicts accurately the story of Irish affairs up to the present day—that is, his facts are historically accurate, and it is only with his handling of them, the gloss, the suppression, the judicious emphasis, that one might quarrel.

There are one or two factors to which the author does not appear to have given the attention they warrant and which should be taken into account by any serious student. Probably from his desire to make clear-cut the Protestant-Unionist, Roman Catholic-Nationalist distinction, Dr. Shearman underrates the importance of the part played by Protestants in the Nationalist movement. For example, he would have us assume that the United Irishmen and the '98 rebellion were almost exclusively Roman Catholic affairs. In fact, Irish Nationalism has more often than not

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GEORGE CATLIN, Ph.D.

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MACDONALD

been officered by Protestants. It may be that the Protestant-Nationalist element which undoubtedly exists both in North and South will eventually provide a basis for reunion. Again, the author writes of Northern Ireland as though it were inhabited entirely by die-hard, loyal royal Orangemen. In fact, the Roman Catholics are the largest religious denomination, slightly more than one-third of the population. And the fact that they are on the increase and the Protestants on the decrease may be time's solution of the partition problem.

Anglo-Irish Relations is not an impartial account; it is advocacy and right good advocacy. The reader will realize that there is a case for the partition of Ireland and that the problem is not one that is going to be solved by good intentions alone. Feelings are still too bitter in Ireland—they are being kept bitter by politicians on both sides of the border—to allow of a satisfactory and permanent settlement. Ireland's would-be friends will best show their good will by leaving comparatively well alone.

F. A. G. WILLIS.

ARE THESE HARDSHIPS NECESSARY?, by Roy Harrod.

Rupert Hart-Davis. 5s.

THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN PEACE AND WAR, by Lionel Robbins. *Macmillan.* 3s. 6d.

There was little to sustain Mr. Harrod's earlier defence of American economic policy, but something can be said in favour of his present thesis, which purports to show that Britain must cut her capital expenditure. Indeed, if Britain's acute economic problems were not to such a large extent governed by external (*versus* internal) factors, such a cut could at least make a subsidiary contribution towards reducing "inflationary pressure", particularly in association with other anti-inflationary measures such as the achievement of a large budget surplus, etc. But to argue thus, adequately and fairly, two things are required: a proper perspective of Britain's economic problems seen against

their international background; a balanced *exposé*, which must deal not only with the short-term advantages, but also with the long-term disadvantages, of reduced capital expenditure.

Considered in isolation, the present condition of Britain's productive equipment commands an exceptionally high rate of capital investment. That it may not be possible to achieve it at present, is a serious misfortune. But it is hardly the way to arrive at a sound economic policy to make virtue out of bitter necessity—with barely a word said about the consequences for the future. To reduce the technical backwardness and to increase the productivity of certain British industries, a good deal of privation and even a limited degree of inflation could be justified. Yet, Mr. Harrod holds that capital investment should be cut by about 500 million £ of which 350 million £ would represent productive investment, the balance a cut in budget expenditure. What such a cut would mean becomes clear from Command Paper 7268 ("Capital investment in 1948") which, it should be pointed out, was published after Mr. Harrod's book. Originally, the forecast for gross investment in 1948 was 1,600 million £. That figure is now to be reduced, so as to correspond, by the end of the year, to an annual expenditure of 1,320 million £ of which repairs and maintenance represent about half. The rest, that is 660 million £, corresponds to about 300 million £ of 1938 value. That was roughly the estimated value of new investment in 1938. The rate of new investment was insufficient even then. How much more so after six years of war.

Mr. Harrod argues that in view of the limited resources in materials, equipment and labour, the cut he proposes is necessary. That, in reality, depends on whether we want to spread restrictions in private consumption over a longer or a shorter period. One must grant the author that in a free society and after a prolonged period of reduced consumption, there is a limit to what traffic will

bear. Had Mr. Harrod confined himself to this argument, agreement would be possible. But he seems to believe that reduced capital investment would more or less automatically and within a relatively short time remove the present difficulties of the balance of payments situation. He writes :

This allegation of a "world dollar shortage" is surely one of the most brazen pieces of collective effrontery that has ever been uttered. (p. 43).

Yet, the reviewer will continue to believe, with brazen effrontery, that the constant excess in the U.S. balance of payments must have a counterpart in the deficits of other countries. Short of a constantly growing flow of lending by the United States, they must lead to a dollar shortage. Britain's deficit, in particular, is largely unavoidable—for, to the extent of forty-five per cent. of their total value, her imports, in 1947, consisted of food, drink and tobacco. And, finally, we shall all have to face the fact, patent by now, that neither retrenchment nor export drive, nor both combined, can proceed sufficiently far to close the gap sufficiently fast. A cut in capital investment will not reduce it appreciably while aggravating the long-term prospects of British economy. Meanwhile, it would seem more important to stop the present flight of capital of which the Balance of Payments White Paper (Cmd. 7324) bears unmistakable evidence.

In *The Economic Problem in Peace and War*, Professor Robbins examines various aspects of the mechanism of distribution, discusses the objectives of production and analyses the premisses which underlie the wartime economic system. He concludes by surveying the control of production in peacetime. Not unexpectedly, the author confesses that he is still inclined to hold that the goal of progress lies in a direction different from over-all collectivism.

These three Marshall Foundation lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1947 are not without interest as a sober and careful restatement of the conceptions of a free-enterprise economist. Professor

Robbins has resigned himself to some cautious qualifications of his basic tenets while maintaining them in their essentials. He shares with Mr. Harrod certain ideas about the advantages of the price mechanism and also about the necessity of reducing capital investment, but he is far more guarded in his judgment. He treads angelically where Mr. Harrod rushes in.

R. P. SCHWARZ.

ORDEAL BY PLANNING, by John Jewkes. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

All through war and post-war controls Manchester has maintained her traditional spirit of economic individualism, and the author of this book who is now Stanley Jevons Professor at Manchester University, is one of its most ardent supporters. His elaborate note to the Working Party on Cotton was an excellent example of this spirit and attracted much attention inside and outside trade circles.

In his new book Professor Jewkes tries to expose in detail many of the fallacies of planning. Beginning with a short analysis of the "spread of the fashion" he raises the question as to whether "the business man has become obsolete" and then deals with all the various arguments put forward against a free economy. In an arresting chapter on national planning and world economy he analyses the causes of the disappointment which so far has followed the much hailed system of planning.

In our present position there are a good many reasons which appear to be more or less accidental and which, therefore, may be quoted by planners as not proving anything against a planned economy in principle. There is the British balance of payments crisis in August 1947 with the running out of the American Loan more quickly than was anticipated. But, as Professor Jewkes rightly emphasizes, "there was something more fundamentally wrong." The collapse was inevitable because of a

series of grave errors in British planning strategy. The first of these lay in the fixing of the export targets and in pursuing policies based upon the assumption that the targets would be reached. The second planning error was the setting of too high a domestic investment programme. The third error was probably the maintenance of an inappropriate rate of exchange.

Professor Jewkes argues that things might have been different if the State had confined itself to its legitimate rôle of restricting the volume of money sufficient to prevent domestic inflation. He seeks to prove this contention among others by dealing in detail with the defects of bulk purchases by the State and he contends that such purchase destroys the futures market, one of the most highly specialized weapons in a free world economy. But will not a free economy still strengthen the power, already formidable, of private monopolies and combination? Professor Jewkes tries to meet this argument in a chapter devoted exclusively to the question: "Must monopoly destroy free economy?", and his observations will attract particular interest now, as the time for monopoly legislation in Britain approaches.

Here it seems that sometimes Professor Jewkes is led astray by his desire to prove his case of economic freedom at all costs. He contends that nowadays the "laboratory" and the ever increasing number of new inventions is fighting against the monopolist. He seems to ignore all that has been said of late about the cartelization of patents and international cartel agreements, dividing fields of research and exploitation of commercial territories. He believes in the possibility of controlling abuses of private monopoly, but he avoids a more detailed discussion of what exactly legislation should do. An analysis of the factual position of monopolies in Britain, in particular as they concern the loopholing of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade by recent court

decisions, would have been an advantage. But Professor Jewkes quite naturally is less concerned with a discussion of the mechanism and the possible deficiencies of unrestricted freedom than with that of the failure of planning. And on this score he may be congratulated for providing an extremely valuable and suggestive piece of work.

HERMANN LEVY.

DECADENCE, by C. E. M. Joad.
Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Joad opens his inquiry into decadence with an estimate of the philosopher's function in the contemporary world. He deprecates the idea that philosophical knowledge should be held back from the many, or its meaning obscured under a deliberately forbidding cloak of recondite phraseology. Those philosophers who withdraw themselves and their knowledge from the world not only isolate themselves from the world's influence but cease to influence the world's affairs. He pleads a strong case for the *vulgarisateur* and instances the beams of enlightenment which emanated from Erasmus in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

In formulating his own comprehensive definition of decadence, Dr. Joad refers to the familiar passage from the Epilogue to Walter Pater's book *The Renaissance* in which reality is fined down to "a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may be even more truly said that it has ceased to be than it is." Experience, "not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end." This view which by implication, denies absolute standards of morality, truth and beauty—for if everything is transitory how can anything be eternal?—Dr. Joad identifies with decadence. Scepticism, hedonism and subjectivism tend to be associated with this view in so far as they depreciate the significance of objective judgments. This preoccupation with subjective values: "This leaving out of 'the object' is an essential part of my definition of

decadence; it is also a pervasive characteristic of the intellectual climate of our time."

Perfection does not exist potentially in human beings. If perfection is apprehensible at all, it is not by the medium of the senses, but it manifests itself through the mind and spirit in such values as truth, beauty and goodness, which are an expression of the perfect element in the non-material world. Only by awareness of and reaching out for these values can the human being advance towards perfection. To discard or disavow them is to deny the existence of standards and ideals. It is to restrict human potentialities to human limits. It is to "drop the object".

Dr. Joad makes a wide survey of the attitude of mind that is implied by the phrase. He criticizes its defects, traces its consequences and devotes the second half of the book to examples drawn from the creative, intellectual and political activities and beliefs of the contemporary world. He determines the malaise by the symptoms he has defined. If his diagnosis is depressing his remedies are constructive, his analysis vivid in its clarity and sparkling in manner. Dr. Joad's systematic location of the objects dropped by a "spiritually rootless and intellectually guideless" generation is admirably consistent with his conception of a philosopher's function.

F. W. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS.

THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS, by

John Newsom. *Faber*. 8s. 6d.

TO BE A TEACHER, by H. C. Dent.

University of London Press. 4s. 6d.

PARTNERSHIP IN EDUCATION,

by various authors. *Jarrolld (Norwich)*.

7s.

As Mr. Newsom's *jeu d'esprit* is on an educational aspect of the eternal war between the sexes it should not lack readers and may for some months to come supply conversational gambits for the austere dinner parties of the middle class. "With notable exceptions," runs his argument, "it is true to say that the

education of girls has been modelled on that of their brothers without any reference to their different functions in society."

A growing number, of course, fit themselves to pursue the same functions through a professional training that takes them to the universities. But Mr. Newsom's interest is in the vast mass who have no higher aim than being mistress, companion or nurse to some man. Now to catch a chemist there is no need for a woman to study chemistry, and so we are led to a wholesale revision of the curriculum. In future the ordinary girl who is not going to be a professional woman needs to study no more than English, physical education, the structure of modern society, and some kind of handicraft. This sounds a magnificent pruning, until one discovers that in physical education, for example, our author includes human biology, social studies and "the effect of the Christian tradition on the contemporary life."

Even Mr. Newsom strays at times into the prevalent anti-intellectualism. "To produce," he writes, "an *Homard à l'Américaine* to perfection needs as much wit as to construe one of the more obscure passages of *Berenice*." Loud cheers from all the men. But obviously he means a different sort of wit, and, if he is honest, a lower sort. Otherwise Mr. Newsom might be expected to choose his friends from among eminent chefs. As he is education officer for Hertfordshire this seems unlikely.

There is a trace of the same misunderstanding in the latest book by Mr. H. C. Dent, who might be called the Rupert of educational reform and certainly did more than most men to create the atmosphere in which the 1944 Act became possible. "Every teacher" he says, "should be a scholar." Now this is like saying that every man should be a saint and equally gratifying to our egalitarian ears, for it implies that every man can be. In fact, far from every teacher being a scholar, very few first-

class honours men are scholars or wish to be. A scholar is a precious rarity, a defender of inherited truths and a discoverer of new, a widener of the bounds of knowledge.

It is perhaps unfair to fall at so much length upon what is only a small point in a sincere and stimulating review of the teacher's training and life's work. This is just the sort of guide that young men or women trying to decide whether or not to become a teacher should have put in their hands. Like the young, it has gusto. At the same time, there are some interesting arguments for older heads, among them a bold plan for rationalizing the teacher's salary. Mr. Dent rightly maintains that the profession must offer solid rewards to others than head masters if it is to attract good recruits. He sees also that the higher salary must go to merit—not to good degrees, for they may be gained by bad teachers, or to seniority which is gained by every fool in time. He proposes "promotion tests" in which teachers will be required to show themselves possessed of leadership and administrative ability, as well as powers of teaching, before further advancement.

The third book is a series of essays, by excellently chosen authorities, on the effects of the new Act upon the various sides of the educational system—the administrative units, the teaching profession, and the people as a whole. Its theme is the necessity of eager co-operation between all parties, from the Ministry down to parents and employers. Some of the essays are mainly expository, as that on the School Health Service by W. A. Bullough, school medical officer for Essex. Others, like the plea by Mr. I. J. Pitman, M.P., that vocational training can be sound education, are admirably provocative. Two outstanding contributions in this vein are the frank discussion of the problems of county administration under the Act by Mr. A. B. Clegg, chief education officer in the West Riding, and the masterly criticism by the Editor of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, Mr. John Armitage, of

the new system of divisional executives.

WALTER JAMES.

EL ALAMEIN TO THE RIVER

SANGRO, by Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. *Hutchinson*. 25s.

THE GOOD SOLDIER, by Field-Marshal Earl Wavell. *Macmillan*. 8s. 6d.

When you study military history don't read outlines on strategy or the principles of war. Read biographies, memoirs, historical novels . . . Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton. To learn that Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manoeuvre on interior lines or some such phrase is of little value. If you can discover how a young unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and controlled generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something.

This quotation, taken out of one of the two books lying in front of me, is a remarkable commentary on the other. It is part of a lecture delivered by Lord Wavell at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1939 and now bound up, together with other material, in a little volume full of shrewdness and wisdom. One might reasonably suppose that Field-Marshal Montgomery's personal record of the 8th Army's campaigns would provide the student of war with precisely the sort of material that Lord Wavell recommends. The odd thing is that it does nothing of the kind. No-one will question, I think, that Field-Marshal Montgomery held that magic power over his troops which distinguishes the great commander from the clever strategist. No-one will doubt for a moment his recognition of the vital part played in war by the impact of the general's personality on the minds of his men. Yet here in his own pages are revealed all the factors that win battles except that one secret. Here are the determination, the judgment, the timing, the capacity for detail and the clarity of mind, set out plainly for all to read. Only the magic of the man escapes. To say so is in no way to detract from the

value of the book. It establishes, however, one thing. Earl Wavell is a fine writer as well as a great general. Viscount Montgomery is a great general.

All those who served in the 8th Army will remember the certainty of victory which came with Field-Marshal Montgomery's command. It is of particular interest to learn from this record how often that certainty was felt by the Commander himself, and at what moments his own conviction wavered—when, in other words, he knew he was taking risks. One such occasion was during the approach to the Mareth Line. Because of a considerable enemy success against American forces, the position on the 1st Army front had at that time become grave. Field-Marshal Montgomery, approaching from the east, was asked to do what he could to relieve the pressure.

But I would not be ready until 4 March, and during the period 28 February–3 March the 8th Army was unbalanced. In driving on to assist the West Tunisian front I had taken serious risks. Rommel had been forced to pull out and was now concentrating against me. The first days of March were an anxious period, during which all the signs of the impending enemy attack were apparent and it remained to be seen whether the enemy could strike before our arrangements to receive him were completed.

In the event Rommel missed his opportunity. His opponent was ready by the evening of March 4. It was not until March 6 that Rommel attacked, after telling his troops that if they did not take Medenine, and force the 8th Army to withdraw, the days of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered. Bizerta and Tunis fell on May 7.

In *The Good Soldier*, Lord Wavell combines a number of essays and papers over a range of subjects from military genius to tactical exercises. In a comparative study of T. E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate he writes: "Both had high-powered minds which seemed when working—and they almost always were—unable to run in any but top gear, however rough the going; so that they impelled the chassis of their bodies at the expense of rest and comfort and with

tear and wear beyond the ordinary." Particularly vivid is the sentence from one of Wingate's own orders. "Finally, knowing the vanity of man's effort and the confusion of his purpose, let us pray that God may accept our services and direct our endeavours, so that when we shall have done all we shall see the fruits of our labour, and be satisfied." That is not a quotation from Cromwell. It is from an order issued on the crossing of the Chindwin in 1943.

GORDON WINTER.

THE SCENTED ISLE, by Joseph Chiari. *William Maclellan*. 7s. 6d.

When Sir Gilbert Elliot wrote in June 1794 to his wife from Corsica he said that it was like Scotland with a fine climate. And the author of this book, a Corsican who has for some years lived in Scotland, draws various parallels between the two. There are also points in which they differ, for the aforesaid Sir Gilbert wrote that if he were to think of building a summer palace of jasper and porphyry he might be thought extravagant by Scots unacquainted with the Corsican quarries. When the Genoese held the island they did not make themselves beloved and we are told of a lady of our day who, after a quarrel with her maid, asked for forgiveness since her outburst of temper was due to her wretched Genoese blood. Of course we all know of Boswell and his enthusiasm for the Corsican patriot Paoli; there was likewise a Corsican Wallace, Sampeiro Corso; both patriots, in order to carry on, had to flee in disguise. But Sampeiro strangled his wife, after a touching scene in 1563 and it is difficult to think that the shock and horror of this affair did not come to Shakespeare's ears.

Mr. Chiari is an admirable guide and the beautiful illustrations in his book will persuade many Scots and others to long for a holiday in Napoleon's island.

H.B.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

To engender the peace of mind needed to tackle the diversity of the books now on the table, and to be their illuminator, Gerald Bullett's *THE TESTAMENT OF LIGHT* (J. M. Dent. 8s. 6d.) is chosen. From Wordsworth to C. Day Lewis, from Bunyan to Wells, from Bacon to Whitman, from Cervantes to Stella Gibbons, there is something in this anthology to meet the crises, international or personal, of these times, or even to counteract the sadness that is part of the keenest enjoyment of a spring day. Moreover, the compiler has relegated the authors' names to the index and their identification by style or thought is a beneficial mental exercise.—Mr. Bullett speaks of those who shy at the term 'God' and Mulk Raj Anand is one. In his *APOLOGY FOR HEROISM* (Lindsay Drummond. 5s.) he demonstrates his conviction that the kingdom of heaven is within us, though he would probably shy at this term too. Through an examination of the inconsistencies and anomalies of living (he realizes what a tough nut evil is to crack) he has worked his passage to a faith that man is the means of his own advancement to "a more graceful and worthy selfhood." His interpretation of the meaning of humanity has become for him the only philosophy by which to live; he says boldly: "I believe in Man." This is a valuable little book, at once a consolation and a stimulus, and, although its implications call for further study, its conclusions are strong enough to confirm in the reader the effect of his previous books, a belief in Mulk Raj Anand.

"A thing of beauty"

How steadfastly one of the greater pre-Raphaelites proclaimed his brand of belief in the possibilities of man is shown by Esther Meynell in her *PORTRAIT OF WILLIAM MORRIS* (Chapman & Hall. 15s.). "Morris is beaten gold" said Ruskin and both men have survived the denigration of the early years of this century to prove that this is no metal for the manufacture of tinkling cymbals.

The author reminds that beauty to Morris was not merely a thing to be looked at but to be made. Thus his genius was not, in the usual connotation of the word, confined to the imagination and in this lies his difference from many of his contemporaries. His socialism, too, was part of a yearning to bring beauty and therefore happiness into the world. To sneer at the "poetic upholsterer" with the silver spoon in his mouth is to leave unsolved the mystery of the energy, the richness, the sheer proficiency undimmed by drudgery of the man. The publishers have produced a book that, with its discrimination in illustration and format, Morris would have delighted to handle, and Mrs. Meynell, in revealing his many-sidedness and indicating his influence on the art of living, has done service to him and to her readers.

Soul and body

And let no-one sneer either at the social consciousness of Oscar Wilde, for his ideas had much in common with Morris's, even to a spell of roadmaking under Ruskin's supervision. Wilde's essay *THE SOUL OF MAN UNDER SOCIALISM*, published in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* in 1891, is reprinted by *The Porcupine Press* (2s. 6d.) and, if its creed is one to which every good Liberal could now subscribe, for this it is all the more to be recommended in a society of increasing authoritarianism. What is more, it is written with a freshness of wit and charm that is quite beyond the capacity of the Socialist writers (there being only one Bernard Shaw, and he without the charm) of to-day.—As a critic of art and life, Wilde had much in common also with Matthew Arnold before "poetry, the divine wisdom," abandoned Arnold, who became—a school inspector. Clifford Dymont has made a selection of the poems and introduced them in *MATTHEW ARNOLD* (Phoenix House. 8s. 6d.), and fairly and succinctly assesses his place in

literature and thought. As a reaction probably from his father's influence this "gay but aloof young man, irreverent in his attitude to authority and convention, affected, frivolous, and in dress rather a dandy" was "terrified that he might get into the hands of the energetic planners of his time and be killed as a poet." How this actually came to pass, how he began to confuse the functions of poetry and religion, how he took up sociology and was caught in "the making of systems" is all told in a parable apt for the age of planning.

Vocations

The farmer is luckier, except for the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture, than most, for it is less irksome to conform to the plan of nature. As the schoolmaster says in David Smith's *THE SAME SKY OVER ALL* (J. M. Dent. 12s. 6d.): "I suppose it's wind, weather and worries shared in what is, after all, man's natural life that makes for comradeship all round." This is the story of Belstead, Hill Farm and Nabbotts, run by the author and his father, and of "the craggy individualists who work alongside his father and himself on arable, meadow and sheep run, in stable, stall and barn." To do an hereditary job well is not perhaps surprising but to write as descriptively and receptively, with such a keen ear and mind for conversational quirks, as Farmer David Smith is no ordinary achievement. The photographs, from "mixing manure by the pear tree" to "winter rest on the fields," are uniformly good and the line pictures, by instructing, fulfil their purpose.— From far away, as far as Egypt is from Essex, comes *THE STREAM OF DAYS* by Taha Hussein (Longmans, Green. 8s. 6d.). This is the second part of his autobiography, translated from the Arabic by Hilary Wayment, and deals with his life as a student in the Islamic university of El Azhar. The translator's Introduction traces the development of this son of poor peasants who won a doctorate at the Sorbonne and who, as Director of General Culture, was "largely responsible for the crea-

tion of the new Farouk I University at Alexandria." And it is an honour to meet such a man in such a book. The reader by happy association, as does Billee Butler who made the drawings, gains something of the sensitiveness to impressions that characterizes Taha Hussein in his transition from the traditional Koranic learning of his ancestors to modern education in the humanities. And this remarkable man is blind, was born blind, and never lets the fact intrude into his narrative.

Haworth and Hollywood

That adversity need not obstruct the eager spirit is learned from the Brontë sisters. It seems only yesterday that we were wishing for further interpretations of that spirit than Mrs. Gaskell's *Life of Charlotte Brontë* by reason of proximity was able to give. To the number published recently is added Laura L. Hinkley's *THE BRONTËS: CHARLOTTE AND EMILY* (Hammond, Hammond. 15s.) which comes from America. It belongs to the 'lease-land' not to the 'Marshall aid' type of contribution and is a very welcome addition to the resources already here. Laura Hinkley guards against inaccuracies or even assumptions, and in her Foreword explains why "a good many things of interest have been omitted. Among closely related subjects held to a minimum are the Brontë country." This will be a deprivation only to the natives of Yorkshire, whose pride of county would prejudice them in any case. For the rest, she gives the Brontë atmosphere admirably and makes the perilous journey into the lives and minds of genius with complete success.— What a scenario Emily Brontë would have written for the bemusement of Hollywood! And without the help too of a little book called *THE RIGHT WAY TO WRITE FOR THE FILMS* ("Right Way Books": Rolls House Publishing Co. 5s.), by Moresby White and Freda Stock, with an Introduction by Noel Langley. The three have had considerable experience in this medium and in such fields as visualizing, choosing a subject, story

construction, treatment, adaptation, dialogue and marketing, their advice appears to be infallible. With such an excellent guide there is no excuse left for the fools who rush in.

Travellers

After 350 years the only novel of the author is republished by *John Lehmann* (15s.). It is *THE UNFORTUNATE TRAVELLER* by Thomas Nashe, illustrated with an Introduction by Michael Ayrton, who avers that "I am unable to assess its value as literature, nor can I judge its particular effect upon subsequent prose fiction." Nevertheless, he proceeds to impart biographical details, to sketch Nashe's intellectual and scholastic background, with appraisements of his pamphlets, verse, play collaborations, qualities and excesses of character, which are indispensable to the newcomer to Nashe's work. In short, Mr. Ayrton, who says he cannot write "a literary introduction" has done it to perfection. And his illustrations explain and complement the script which, in its archaic spelling and style is at first daunting, with his usual brilliance and competency. The book is a mixture of "lyrical beauty interspersed with episodes of violent savagery"—just when one had hoped the post-war fashion in violence had abated.—*Elspeth Huxley's* novel *THE WALLED CITY* (*Chatto & Windus*. 10s. 6d.) is an exercise on colonial administration in an Arabian community set in the desert under an African sun which, in spite of the somewhat stilted dialogue and situations, indicating surely the urging of a cause rather than the telling of a tale, held the interest to the last word. Freddy, the natural bureaucrat, Robert, the visionary who sees human beings in all his contacts, the wives Amorel and Priscilla, are tangled in private and public responsibilities. It is not unnatural that Mrs. Huxley's wide knowledge of her subject should tempt her to write a 'documentary' and nobody who reads the open acknowledgment of this fact

on the book's jacket should be deterred from embarking on the adventure it provides.

Shivers

SOMETHING TERRIBLE, SOMETHING LOVELY is a collection of short stories by William Sansom (*Hogarth Press*. 8s. 6d.) where, again, the terror looms large in nightmare encounters. Any straining after effect has been pruned with a sharp knife or, better, smoothed into the texture until it is indistinguishable, so that the desired atmosphere has all the appearance of having been created with ease. There is always the doubt of course that the preference for writing of horror is a sterile one, in that the story is remembered only as a bad dream is remembered.—Which brings us straight to *GREAT TALES OF TERROR AND THE SUPERNATURAL*, edited by Herbert A. Wise and Phyllis Fraser (*Hammond, Hammond*. 18s.). Here are 832 pages, of the reading of which the editors wisely suggest that "too generous a ration of horror may defeat its intended purpose, and succeed only in creating a surfeit." They discuss the fascination that such tales hold, the question of ghosts, credibility and the place of modern terror stories. Read them in bed and the maximum of contrast is obtained by the doings on the printed page and the comfort and security of the blankets, under which if the worst happens, the head may be popped. Downstairs, ash falls from the fire, curtains rustle and, in a bomb damaged house at least, door handles gently but suggestively quiver. The only valid deterrent to reading this collection—which includes examples from such masters as Poe, Hawthorne, de Maupassant, Sheridan Le Fanu, with that of others whose names are associated with more orthodox branches of literature, like Walter de la Mare, E. M. Forster, Edith Wharton and Robert Hichens—horizontally is the weight of the book.

GRACE BANYARD.

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